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TAMENESS FOR SET THEORY I
MATTEO VIALE
Abstract. The paper is a first of two and aims to show that (assuming large cardinals)
set theory is a tractable (and we dare to say tame) first order theory when formalized
in a first order signature with natural predicate symbols for the basic definable concepts
of second and third order arithmetic, and appealing to the model-theoretic notions of
model completeness and model companionship.
Specifically we develop a general framework linking generic absoluteness results to
model companionship and show that (with the required care in details) a Π2-property
formalized in an appropriate language for second or third order number theory is forcible
from some T ⊇ ZFC+large cardinals if and only if it is consistent with the universal
fragment of T if and only if it is realized in the model companion of T .
The paper is accessible to any person who has a fair acquaintance with set theory
and first order logic at the level of an under-graduate course in both topics; however
bizarre this may appear (given the results we aim to prove) no knowledge of forcing or
large cardinals is required to get the proofs of its main results (if one accepts as black-
boxes the relevant generic absoluteness results). On the other hand familiarity with the
notions of model completeness and model companionship is essential. All the necessary
model-theoretic background will be given in full detail.
The present work expands and systematize previous results obtained with Venturi.
The key model-theoretic result of this paper is that the definable1 (and conservative)
extension of any T ⊇ ZFC introducing predicates for the ∆0-definable (class) relations,
function symbols for the ∆0-definable (class) functions, and predicates for the lightface
definable projective subsets of P (κ) has as model companion the T -provable fragment of
the theory of Hκ+ in this signature (cfr. Thm. 3).
We also give evidence that any existence proof of the model companion of some T
extending ZFC+large cardinals comes in pairs with generic absoluteness results for T .
Specifically we use Thm. 3 (and variations of it) to show that these results couple
perfectly with Woodin’s generic absoluteness for second order number theory (cfr Thm.
1), the theory of Hℵ2 assuming Woodin’s axiom (∗) (cfr Thm. 2, Thm. 5, Thm. 7), and
the author’s generic absoluteness results for the theory of Hℵ2 (cfr Thm. 4).
We proceed stating our main results.
Notation 1. Let T be a τ -theory. T∀ is the family of Π1-sentences
2 ψ for τ which are
provable from T . Accordingly we define T∃, T∀∃, etc.
Let τST be a signature containing predicate symbols Rψ of arity m for all bounded
3
∈-formulae ψ(x1, . . . , xm), function symbols fθ of arity k for for all bounded ∈-formulae
θ(y, x1, . . . , xk), constant symbols ω and ∅. ZFCST ⊇ ZFC is the τST-theory obtained
adding axioms which force in each of its τST-models ∅ to be interpreted by the empty set,
The author acknowledge support from INDAM through GNSAGA and from the project: PRIN 2017-
2017NWTM8R Mathematical Logic: models, sets, computability. MSC: 03E35 03E57 03C25.
1According to [11, Ch. I.13].
2A Πn-formula for τ relative to T is a τ -formula admitting a T -equivalent formula in prenex normal
form with blocks of alternating quantifiers with ∀ being its leftmost quantifier. Accordingly we define
Σn-formulae relative to T . The ∆n-formulae relative to T are those which are both Πn and Σn. We also
say universal τ -formula for a Π1-formula for τ and existential τ -formula for a Σ1-formula for τ .
3A formula is bounded if all its quantifiers are bounded to range over its free variables or constant symbols
(see [11, Def. IV.3.5]).
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ω to be interpreted by the first infinite ordinal, each Rψ as the class of k-tuples defined
by the bounded formula ψ(x1, . . . , xk), each fθ as the l-ary class function whose graph
is the extension of the bounded formula θ(x1, . . . , xl, y) (whenever θ defines a functional
relation). Essentially ZFCST is set theory axiomatized in a language admitting predicate
symbols for ∆0-predicates, ∆0-definable functions, and a constant for the first infinite
cardinal (see Notation 2 and Fact 1 below for details).
Let σST be a signature containing predicate symbols Sψ of arity n for all τST-formulae
φ(x1, . . . , xn); let Let σω = σST ∪ τST. ZFC
∗
ω ⊇ ZFCST is the σω-theory obtained adding
axioms which force in each of its σω-models each predicate symbol Sφ of arity n to be
interpreted as the subset of P (ω<ω)n defined by4 the τST-formula φ
P(ω<ω)(x1, . . . , xn).
Essentially ZFC∗ω extends ZFCST adding predicate symbols for the lightface definable pro-
jective sets5 (again see Notation 2 and Fact 1 below for details).
Theorem 1. Let T be a σω-theory such that
6
T ⊇ ZFC∗ω + there are class many Woodin cardinals.
Then T has a model companion T ∗. Moreover TFAE for any Π2-sentence ψ for σω:
(1) For all universal σω-sentences θ such that T + θ is consistent, so is T∀ + θ + ψ;
(2) T proves that some forcing notion P forces ψH˙ω1 ;
(3) T ⊢ ψHω1 ;
(4) ψ ∈ T ∗.
Theorem 2. Let σω,NSω1 be the extension of σω with a unary predicate symbol NSω1 and
a constant symbol ω1. Consider the {∈, ω1,NSω1}-sentences:
θω1 ≡ ω1 is the first uncountable cardinal,
θStat ≡ ∀x (x ⊆ ω1 is non-stationary ↔ NSω1(x)).
Let ZFC∗ω,NSω1
be the theory
ZFC
∗
ω + θStat + θω1 .
Let also θSC be the ∈-sentence:
There are class many supercompact cardinals.
TFAE for any
T ⊇ ZFC∗ω,NSω1 + θSC
and for any Π2-sentence ψ for σω,NSω1 :
(1) For all universal σω,NSω1 -sentences θ such that T+θ is consistent, so is T∀+θ+ψ;
(2) T proves that some forcing notion P forces ψH˙ω2 ;
(3) T∀ + ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
+ θSC + (∗)-UB ⊢ ψ
Hω2 .
See Remark 1(6) for some information on (∗)-UB.
In this article we will give a self-contained proof of Thm. 1 and of a weaker variation
of Thm. 2 (cfr. Thm. 4). Thm. 2 is an easy corollary of results which we will formulate
in this paper at a later stage (since they need more terminology then what has been
introduced so far to be properly stated), and which will be proved in a sequel of this paper
4For a set or definable class Z and a τST-formula ψ, ψ
Z denotes the τST-formula obtained from ψ requiring
all its quantifiers to range over Z.
5We decide to use P
(
ω<ω
)
rather than P (ω) (or any other uncountable Polish space) to simplify slightly
the coding devices we are going to implement to prove Thm. 1. Similar considerations brings us to focus
on P
(
ω<ω1
)
rather than P (ω1) in the formulation of Thm. 4 and on P
(
κ<ω
)
rather than P (κ) in the
formulation of Thm. 3. At the prize of complicating slightly the relevant proofs one can choose to replace
α<ω by α all over for α any among ω,ω1, κ.
6It is not relevant for this paper to define Woodin cardinals. A definition is given in [13, Def. 1.5.1], for
example.
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(since their proof is considerably more involved, and its inclusion here would make the
length of this paper grow exponentially).
Some of the following remarks are technical and require a strong background in set
theory. The reader can safely skip them without compromising the comprehension of the
remainder of this paper.
Remark 1.
(1) The theories T considered in all the above theorems are definable and conservative
extensions of their ∈-fragment; more precisely: for any of the above signatures
τ there is a recursive list of axioms Tτ ⊆ T such that any ∈-structure admits a
unique extension to a τ -structure which models Tτ (see Fact 1 below).
The key but trivial observation is that in the new signatures one can express
the same concepts one can express in the signature ∈, but using for many of these
concepts formulae of much lower complexity according to the prenex normal form
stratification. For example:
• In σω projective determinacy is expressible by means of a family of contably
many atomic sentences (see item 5 below).
• There is an uncountable cardinal is expressible by the Σ2-sentence for τST
(and σω)
∃x [(x is an ordinal ∧ ω ∈ x) ∧ ∀f [(f is a function ∧ dom(f) ∈ x)→ ran(f) 6= x]
(and this concept cannot be expressed in this signature by a formula of lower
complexity, even in σω).
• On the other hand the above sentence is ZFC∗−ω,NSω1
-equivalent to the universal
τST ∪ {ω1}-sentence:
[(ω1 is an ordinal ∧ ω ∈ ω1) ∧ ∀f [(f is a function ∧ dom(f) ∈ ω1)→ ran(f) 6= ω1].
Our focus will be to understand which concepts are expressible by universal sen-
tences and which are expressible by Π2-sentences in the appropriate signatures.
One of the basic intuition leading to the above theorems is that the axiomati-
zation of set theory in the signature {∈} make unnecessarily complicated the for-
malization of many basic set theoretic properties; however if one adds the “right”
predicates and constant symbols to denote certain basic properties (i.e. the ∆0-
properties) and certain more complicated ones of which we have however a clear
grasp (i.e. the projective sets and the non-stationary ideal), the logical complexity
of set-theoretic concepts lines up with our understanding of them. Once this opera-
tion is performed, the two theorems above show (assuming large cardinals) that for
Π2-properties consistency with the universal fragment of T overlaps with forcibility
over models of T and with provability with respect to the right extension of T .
(2) Theorems 1 and 2 are special instantiation of a method which pairs the notion of
model companionship with generic absoluteness results. Roughly the equivalence
between (1) and (3) of the two theorems follow from the existence of a model
companion for T in the appropriate signature, while the equivalence of (2) and (3)
follows from generic absoluteness results.
(3) The reader may wonder why Thm. 1 does not conflict with Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorem. Let T0 be the theory
ZFCω + there are class many Woodin cardinals.
The Go¨del ∈-sentence Con(T0) and its negation become atomic τST-sentences (since
all their quantifiers range over ω), hence a part of the universal (or of the Π2) the-
ory of any complete extension of T0. However there are complete extensions of T0
containing Con(T0) and others containing its negation, therefore the equivalences
set forth in Thm. 1 are not violated letting the ψ of the theorem be Con(T0).
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Note on the other hand that the content of Thm. 1 is that “almost” any ques-
tion of second order arithmetic (see the next item) is decided by large cardinal
axioms: apart from Go¨del sentences, it is clearly open whether there are more in-
teresting arithmetic (or even projective) statements (such as Golbach’s conjecture
or Schanuel’s conjecture or Riemann’s hypothesis) which are independent of these
axioms. Similar considerations apply to Theorem 2.
(4) Every lightface projective set (i.e. any definable subset without parameters of the
structure (P (N) ,∈,⊆)) is the extension of a quantifier free formula in σω. Letting
φn(x, y) by a τST-formula defining a universal set for Σ
1
n+1-sets, it is not hard to
see that projective determinacy (according to the notation of [10, Section 20.A])
is given by an axiom scheme of τST-sentences in which quantifiers range just over
subsets of P (ω<ω). In particular projective determinacy is expressed by a family
of atomic sentences for σω in ZFC
∗
ω.
(5) The negation of the Continuum hypothesis CH is expressible in the signature τST∪
{ω1} ⊆ σω,NSω1 as the Π2-sentence ψ¬CH:
(ω1 is the first uncountable cardinal)∧
∧∀f [(f is a function ∧ dom(f) = ω1)→ ∃r(r ⊆ ω ∧ r 6∈ ran(f))].
Most of third order number theory is expressible in this signature by a Π2-sentence,
for example this is the case for Suslin’s hypothesis, every Aronszjain tree is special,
and a variety of other statements.
(6) It is out of the scopes of the present paper to define (∗)-UB; it will be essentially
used only in the sequel of this work; 3 of Thm. 2 is the unique place of this paper
where this statement will ever be mentioned. For the convenience of the interested
reader we include its definition in Section 5. Let us just briefly say that (∗)-UB is
the strong form of Woodin’s axiom (∗) asserting that NSω1 is saturated together
with the existence of an L(UB)-generic filter for Woodin’s Pmax-forcing
7 (where
L(UB) is the smallest transitive model of ZF containing all the universally Baire
sets).
Our ambition is to make the remainder of this paper self-contained and accessible to
any person who has a fair acquaintance with set theory and first order logic. From now
on no familiarity with forcing, large cardinal axioms, forcing axioms is needed or assumed
on the reader, all it is required is just to accept as meaningful the statement of these
theorems.
The following piece of notation will be used.
Notation 2.
• τST is the extension of the first order signature {∈} for set theory which is obtained
by adjoining predicate symbols Rφ of arity n for any ∆0-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn),
function symbols of arity k for any ∆0-formula θ(y, x1, . . . , xk) and constant sym-
bols for ω and ∅.
• σST is the signature containing a predicate symbol Sφ of arity n for any τST-formula
φ with n-many free variables.
• σκ = σST ∪ τST ∪ {κ} with κ a constant symbol.
• ZFC− is the ∈-theory given by the axioms of ZFC minus the power-set axiom.
• TST is the τST-theory given by the axioms
∀~x (R∀x∈yφ(y, ~x)↔ ∀x(x ∈ y → Rφ(y, x, ~x))
∀~x [Rφ∧ψ(~x)↔ (Rφ(~x) ∧Rψ(~x))]
∀~x [R¬φ(~x)↔ ¬Rφ(~x)]
7See [12] for details on Pmax.
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(∀~x∃!y Rφ(y, ~x))→ (∀~xRφ(fφ(~x), ~x))
for all ∆0-formulae φ(~x), together with the ∆0-sentences
∀x ∈ ∅¬(x = x),
ω is the first infinite ordinal
(the former is an atomic τST-sentence, the latter is expressible as the Π1-sentence
for τST stating that ω is a non-empty limit ordinal contained in any other non-
empty limit ordinal).
• Tκ is the σST ∪ {κ}-theory given by the axioms
(1) ∀x1 . . . xn [Sψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ (
n∧
i=1
xi ⊆ κ
<ω ∧ ψP(κ
<ω)(x1, . . . , xn))]
as ψ ranges over the ∈-formulae.
• ZFC−
ST
is the τST-theory
ZFC
− ∪ TST
• ZFC−κ is the τST ∪ {κ}-theory
ZFC
−
ST
∪ {κ is an infinite cardinal} ;
• ZFC∗−κ is the σκ-theory
ZFC
−
κ ∪ Tκ;
• ZFC∗−ω is
ZFC
∗−
κ ∪ {κ is the first infinite cardinal} ;
• Accordingly we define ZFCST, ZFCκ, ZFC
∗
ST, ZFC
∗
κ, ZFC
∗
ω.
Fact 1. Every σκ-formula is Tκ ∪ TST-equivalent to an {∈, κ}-formula.
Moreover assume κ is a definable cardinal (i.e. κ = ω or κ = ω1); more precisely
assume there is an ∈-formula ψκ(x) such that
ZFC
− ⊢ ∃!x [ψκ(x) ∧ (x is a cardinal)].
Then every σκ-formula is ZFC
∗−
κ + ψκ(κ)-equivalent to an ∈-formula.
Proof. The axioms of TST and Tκ are cooked up exactly so that one can prove the result
by a straightforward induction on the σκ-formulae (see also the proof of Prop. 3.21). 
Theorem 1 is an immediate corollary of Woodin’s generic results for second order number
theory (cfr. [18]) coupled with the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Assume T ⊇ ZFC∗κ is a σκ-theory. Then T has a model companion T
∗.
Moreover for any Π2-sentence ψ for σκ, TFAE:
(1) ψ ∈ T ∗;
(2) T ⊢ ψHκ+ ;
(3) For all universal σκ-sentences θ, T∀+θ is consistent if and only if so is T∀+θ+ψ.
We note that approximations to Thm. 3 for the case κ = ω, and to Thm. 1 already
appears in [15].
The present paper give a self-contained proof of Theorems 1 and 3. We defer to a second
paper the proof of Theorem 2 (which reposes on the recent breakthrough by Aspero` and
Schindler establishing that Woodin’s axiom (∗) follows fromMM++ [1]); here we will prove
a weaker version of it (cfr. Thm. 4) at the end of Section 2.
We prove rightaway Thm. 1 assuming Thm. 3:
Proof. Woodin’s generic absoluteness results for second order number theory give that 1(3)
and 1(2) are equivalent (we give here a self-contained proof of this particular instance of
Woodin’s results in Theorem 4.7). Theorem 3 gives the equivalence of 1(1) and 1(3). 
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The proof and statement of Thm. 3 require familiarity with set theory at the level of
an undergraduate book (for example [8] coupled with [11, Chapters III, IV] is far more
than sufficient) as well as familiarity with the notion of model companionship.
To complete this introductory section it is convenient to sort out how the definable
extensions ZFC∗ST, ZFC
∗
ω, ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
behave with respect to forcing. A central role is played
by large cardinal axioms. The reader can safely skip this remark without compromising
the reading of the sequel of this paper.
Remark 2. We outline here the invariance under forcing of the Π1-theory of V in certain
natural signatures; since the universal fragment of a theory T determines completely its
model companion, the fact that in certain signatures τ forcing cannot change the Π1-theory
of V (in combination with Levy’s absoluteness theorem) is the key to understand why set
theory can have a model companion in some of these signatures, and why the properties of
the model companion theory are paired with generic absoluteness results.
• The standard absoluteness results of Kunen’s book [11, Ch. IV] show that if G is
V generic for some forcing notion P ∈ V , V ⊑ V [G] for τST.
• Shoenfield’s absoluteness Lemma entails that if G is V generic for some forcing
notion P ∈ V , V ≺1 V [G] for τST.
This holds since Hω1 ≺ V and H
V [G]
ω1 ≺ V [G] (cfr. Lemma 4.1), and Hω1 ≺
H
V [G]
ω1 (see for example [17, Lemma 1.2]) for the signature τST.
• Major results of the Cabal seminar bring that assuming the existence of class many
Woodin cardinals in V , if G is V generic for some forcing notion P ∈ V , V ⊑ V [G]
for σω (roughly because H
V
ω1
≺ H
V [G]
ω1 by Thm. 4.7, while H
V
ω1
≺1 V and H
V [G]
ω1 ≺1
V [G] by Lemma 4.1) for the signature σω. More generally the same large cardinal
assumptions and argument yield that V ⊑ V [G] also for the signature extending
τST ∪ UB with predicate symbols for all universally Baire sets of V (instead of
considering just the lightface projective sets as done by σω).
• Assume G is V generic for some forcing notion P ∈ V . V ⊑ V [G] for τST ∪
{ω1,NSω1} if and only if P is stationary set preserving: for the atomic predicates
NSω1 the formula ¬NSω1(S) is preserved between V and V [G] for all S ⊆ ω1 in
V only in this case. The sentence ω1 is the first uncountable cardinal is preserved
only if P does not collapse ω1.
• Assuming the existence of class many Woodin cardinals in V for any forcing P ∈ V
(i.e. also if P is not stationary set preserving or collapses ω1), for any G V -generic
for P , V [G] and V satisfy the same Π1-sentences for σω,NSω1 (Thm. 6).
• On the other hand the signature σκ with κ ≥ ω1 behaves badly with respect to
forcing; one has to put severe limitation on the type of forcings P considered in
order to maintain that V ⊑ V [G] or just that V and V [G] satisfy the same universal
σκ-sentences (see Remark 2.6 to appreciate the difficulties). However we will prove
an interesting variation of Thm. 2 for σκ in case κ is interpreted by ω1 (cfr. Thm.
4).
These results combined together give the following argument for the proof of (2) implies
(1) of Thm. 2 (mutatis mutandis for the proof of (2) implies (1) of Thm. 1): let ψ be a
Π2-sentece for σω,NSω1 satisfying (2). Given some Π1-sentence θ for σω,NSω1 consistent
with T , find M model of T + θ. By (2) some forcing P ∈ M forces ψHω2 . By Thm. 6
and Levy’s absoluteness Lemma 4.1, the theory T∀ + θ + ψ holds in H
N
ω2
whenever N is a
generic extension of M by P .
The paper is organized as follows:
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• Section 2 proves Thm. 3 (WARNING: familiarity with the notion of model com-
panionship is required). We also include in its last part a proof of a weaker variation
of Thm. 2 (cfr. Thm. 4).
• Section 3 gives a detailed account of model completeness and model companion-
ship8.
• Section 4 gives a self-contained proof of the form of Levy absoluteness and of the
particular form of Woodin’s generic absoluteness results we employ in this paper9.
• Section 1 gives some intuitions motivating Theorems 1, 2, 3, and a few “philo-
sophical” considerations we can draw from them (in particular an argument for
the failure of CH). The reader can safely skip it without compromising the com-
prehension of the remainder of the paper (WARNING: familiarity with the notion
of model companionship is required).
• Section 5 collects the main results we will prove in a sequel of this paper.
The paper contains (overly?) detailed proofs of every non-trivial result (many of which
can be also found elsewhere i.e. most —if not all— of those appearing in sections 3 and 4),
this has been made at the expenses of its brevity. Our hope is that this approach makes
the paper accessible to all scholars with a basic knowledge of set theory and model theory.
The reader unfamiliar with the notion of model companionship and its main implications
should start with Section 3, rather than with Sections 2 or 1.
Acknowledgements. This research has been completed while visiting the E´quipe de Logique
Mathe´matique of the IMJ in Paris 7 in the fall semester of 2019. The author thanks Boban
Velicˇkovic´, David Aspero´, Giorgio Venturi, for the fruitful discussions held on the topics of the
present paper; I particularly thank Venturi for contributing substantially to the elaboration of
many of the considerations in Section 1, and Velicˇkovic` for providing counterexamples to many of
my attempts to produce generalizations of the results of the present paper.
The opportunity to present preliminary versions of these results in the set theory seminar of
the E´quipe has also given me the possibility to improve them substantially. I thank all the people
attending it for their many useful comments, in particular Alessandro Vignati.
There are many others with whom I exchanged frutiful and informative discussions on these
topics, among them Philipp Schlicht and Neil Barton.
1. Some comments
Let us bring to light some ideas bringing to Theorems 1, 2, 3.
Correct signatures for set theory. A first basic idea is that bounded formulae express “sim-
ple” properties of sets. The Levy stratification of set-theoretic properties consider those
expressed by bounded formulae the simplest; then the complexity increases as unbounded
quantifiers lines up in the prenex normal form of a formula. In particular the Levy strat-
ification matches exactly with the stratification of τST-formulae according to the number
of alternating quantifiers in their ZFCST-equivalent prenex form.
Assume instead we measure the complexity of a set theoretic property P according to the
number of alternating quantifiers of the prenex normal form of its ∈-formalization. Then
many basic properties already have high complexity: the formula z = {x, y} is expressed by
a Π1 formula for ∈; the ∈-formula expressing f is a function by means of Kuratowski pairs
to define relations has already so many quantifiers that one cannot estimate their numbers
at first glance, etc. If we resort to the axiomatization of set theory given by ZFCST, this
8Our ambition is that this section could serve as a compact self-contained account of the key properties of
model companion theories.
9We included these results here, because the versions of these results we found in the literature were not
exactly fitting to our set up. Again our purpose for this section is to simplify the reader’s task, as well to
give minor improvements of known results.
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problem is overruled, and these two properties are expressed by atomic τST-formulae
10.
In particular reformulating ZFC using the signature τST recalibrates the complexity of
formulae letting arbitrarily complex ∈-formulae become atomic, while not changing the
set of ZFC-provable theorems, and stratifies set theoretic properties in complete accordance
with the Levy hierarchy11.
Levy absoluteness and model companionship. Mostowski collapsing theorem and the axiom
of choice allow to code a set by a well founded relation on its hereditary cardinality, and
in this way translate in an “absolute manner” questions about sets in Hκ+ to questions
about P (κ). The content of Theorem 3 is that we can give a very precise model-theoretic
meaning to the term “absolute manner”: any σκ-formula is ZFC
−
κ +{all sets have size κ}-
equivalent to a universal σκ-formula and to an existential σκ-formula, i.e. it is a provably
∆1-property in this theory. What happens is that we encoded complicated questions about
the power-set of κ by means of atomic predicates, since the axioms listed in 1 amount to
a method to eliminate quantifiers ranging over P (κ). So Theorem 3 is another way to
reformulate that the first order theory of Hκ+ reduces to the first order theory of P (κ) in
an absolute manner.
Remark also that for all models (V,∈) of ZFC and all cardinals κ ∈ V and all signatures
τκ ⊆ τ ⊆ τκ ∪ P (P (κ))
(HV
κ+
, τV ) ≺1 (V, τ
V ) is the unique transitive substructure of V containing P (κ) which
models ZFC− and the Π2-sentence for τκ
∀X∃f (f : κ→ X is surjective).
In particular if a model companion of the τ -theory of V exists, this can only be the τ -theory
of Hκ+.
Generic invariance of the Π1-theory of V in a given signature. We say that a signature σ
is generically tame for a σ-theory T extending ZFCκ if the Π1-consequences of T must be
preserved through forcing extensions of models of T (which brings the implication (2)→(1)
of Theorem 1 — as well as the corresponding implications of Theorems 2, 5, 7 — by the
argument sketched in Remark 2).
Theorem 6 shows that this generic invariance holds for all12 σ ⊆ τNSω1 ∪ UB
V where
UB
V denotes the family of universally Baire sets of some (V,∈) which models ZFC+large
cardinals.
Theorem 6 is close to optimal: a (for me surprising) fact remarked by Boban Velicˇkovic`
is that Thm. 6 cannot possibly hold for any σ ⊇ τST ∪ {ω1, ω2}, where ω2 is a constant
which names the second uncountable cardinal:
ω2 is a Σ1-statement for τω2 = τST ∪ {ω1} ∪ {ω2}:
∃ {Cα : α < ω2}[
∀α ∈ ω2 (Cα is a club subset of α)∧
∧ ∀α ∈ β ∈ ω2 (α ∈ lim(Cβ)→ Cα = Cβ ∩ α)∧
∧ ∀α (otp(Cα) ≤ ω1)
].
10There are atomic τST-formulae whose ZFCST-equivalent prenex ∈-formula of least complexity has an
arbitrarily large number of alternating quantifiers.
11Nonetheless there are ∈-sentences whose least complexity ZFCST-equivalent τST-sentence in prenex normal
form has an arbitrary finite number of alternating quantifiers, examples are given by lightface definable
universal sets for Σ1n-properties (cfr. [15, Thm. 4.6]).
12See Notation 3 for the definition of τNSω1
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ω2 is forcible by very nice forcings (countably directed and < ω2-strategically closed),
and its negation is forcible by Coll(ω1, < δ) whenever δ is supercompact.
In particular the Π1-theory for τω2 of any forcing extension V [G] of V can be destroyed
in a further forcing extension V [G][H], hence is not invariant across forcing extensions of
V in any possible sense, assuming large cardinals in V .
Theorems 1, 2, 5, 7 show that the strong form of consistency given by (1) of Theorem 1
can characterize forcibility (at least for Π2-sentences in the appropriate signature), if large
cardinals enter the picture.
Model companionship and generic absoluteness. The first order theory of P (κ) for any
infinite κ is very sensitive to forcing; but this depends on two parameters: whether or not
we assume large cardinals, and what is the signature in which we look at the first order
theory of P (κ).
Theorem 6 shows that we can “tune” the signature σ so that for any σ-theory T ex-
tending ZFC+large cardinals:
• the signature is expressive (i.e. many questions of second or third order arithmetic
can be encoded by simple sentences, i.e. Π2-sentences for σ);
• the signature is not too expressive (i.e. the questions of second or third order arith-
metic whose truth value can be changed by means of forcing cannot be encoded
by Π1-sentences for τ ; in particular the Π1-fragment of ZFC in the new signature
is invariant across the generic multiverse, cfr. Thm. 6).
These two conditions entail that 1(2) implies 1(1) (respectively 2(2) implies 2(1)). Generic
absoluteness results give that 1(2) is equivalent to 1(3) (respectively 2(2) is equivalent
2(3)).
Model completeness of the relevant theories gives the missing implication from (1) to
(3) of Theorems 1, 2, 5, 7.
Model companionship and generic absoluteness for second order number theory. The stan-
dard argument used in set theory to assert that ∆0-properties are simple, is their invariance
between transitive models, which in turns imply that their truth values cannot be changed
by means of forcing.
Now consider second order number theory i.e.: the theory of the structure (P (ω) ,∈);
modulo the by-interpretation which identifies a hereditarily countable set with the graph
of the transitive closure of its singleton (see Section 2), the theory of (P (ω) ,∈) has the
same set of theorems as the first order theory of the structure (Hω1 , τST), which in turns
(by Fact 1) has the same set of theorems as the structure (Hω1 , σω). The first order theory
of Hω1 in any of these signatures can vary (by means of forcing) if one denies the existence
of large cardinals (for example there can be lightface definable projective well-orders, or
not): on the other hand a major result of Woodin is that assuming large cardinals, the
first order theory of (Hω1 ,∈) is invariant with respect to forcing. The equivalence of (2)
and (1) in Theorem 1 says that this theory is fixed by any reasonable method to produce
its models, not just forcing.
Now we combine these results with the clear picture given by projective determinacy
of the theory of projective sets: much in the same way we accept bounded formulae as
“simple” predicates and make them equivalent to atomic formulae by means of ZFCST, if
we accept as true large cardinal axioms, we are forced to consider projective sets of reals as
“simple” predicates; ZFCω includes them among the atomic predicates. Once we do so the
first order theory of Hω1 is “tame” i.e. model complete, hence it realizes all Π2-sentences
which are consistent with its universal fragment (cfr. Fact 3.11); moreover large cardinals
make provably true many of these Π2-sentences, for example projective determinacy.
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Model companionship and generic absoluteness for the theory of P (ω1). Theorem 2 ex-
tends the above considerations to the signature σω,NSω1 . In this case a theory T extending
ZFC+large cardinals is just able to say that:
• a Π2-sentence for σω,NSω1 is consistent with the universal fragment of T if it is
T -provably forcible (cfr. 2 implies 1 of Thm. 2, see Remark 2 for a proof).
• The theory T ∗ given by all Π2-sentences ψ for σω,NSω1 such that ψ
Hω2 is provably
forcible is consistent (cfr. 2 implies 3 of Thm. 2, one of the main results of Woodin
on Pmax [12, Thm. 7.3]).
• Recently Aspero` and Schindler proved that MM++ implies (∗)-UB [1]. An imme-
diate corollary of their result is that T ∗ holds in the Hω2 of models of MM
++. This
result allow to prove the missing implications in Thm. 2 (or in Thm. 5, 7).
We will prove the assertions in the above items using Thm. 2, 5, 7 and Aspero` and
Schindler’s result in a sequel of this paper.
Model completeness and bounded forcing axioms. Let us now spend some more words
relating model completeness to bounded forcing axioms and (∗)-UB. Model companionship
and model completeness capture in a model theoretic property the notion of “generic”
structure for the models of a theory; this notion is recurrent in various domains (not only
restricted to model theory), we mention two occurring in model theory: in many cases
the Fraisse limit of a given family F of finite(ly generated) structures for a signature τ is
generic for the structures in F ; the algebraically closed field are generic with respect to the
class of fields. Generic structures of a universal theory T realize as many Π2-properties as
it is consistently possible while remaining a model of T . The standard examples of generic
structures for a first order theory T are given by T -existentially closed model, i.e. models
which are Σ1-substructures of any superstructure which realizes (the universal fragment
of) T . We will make this rigorous in Section 3.
Compare these observations with the formulation of bounded forcing axioms as prin-
ciples of generic absoluteness (as done by Bagaria in [5]) stating that HVω2 is a Σ1-
substructure of any generic extension of V obtained by forcings in the appropriate class.
In essence Theorem 2 and Thm. 5 outline that forcing axioms provide means to produce
models of Hω2 which are existentially closed for their universal theory and realize as many
Π2-sentences as the iteration theorems producing them makes possible.
Why CH is false. Summing up on the above considerations, we believe we can give a strong
argument against CH:
Assume we adopt the stance that:
• Large cardinal axioms are true.
• We consider set theory as formalized by a definable extension T of
ZFC+large cardinals in a signature σ where CH can be correctly for-
malized, i.e. T is a definable extension of ZFCω1 in the signature
σ ⊇ τST ∪ {ω1} including a constant symbol for the first uncountable
cardinal, so that:
– ¬CH is formalized by a Π2-sentence for τST∪{ω1}, (cfr. Remark
1(5)).
– The Π1-fragment of T is invariant across forcing extensions (so
that the basic facts about P (ω1) —i.e those expressible by Π1-
sentences for σ— are not changed by means of forcing (cfr. (2)
implies (1) of Thm. 2 holds for T ).
Furthermore to select which among all possible T in the signature σ gives
the true “axiomatization” of set theory, we adopt the following criteria:
• T should maximize the family of Π2-sentences for σ which are consis-
tent with its Π1-consequences (cfr. Thm. 2(1));
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• there should be a simple and manageable axiom system for T (cfr.
Thm. 2(3) or even T has a model companion T ∗).
With these premises, we conclude that Theorem 2 (also with Thm. 5, 7)
implies that CH is false (since ¬CH is provably forcible from T ).
We can further reinforce our case by remarking that:
• The same assumptions on T and T ∗ entail 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 holds in any τ -model N of
T∀ + ZFC in which T
∗ holds in HNω2 : 2
ℵ0 = ℵ2 is not a Π2-sentence for τω1 , but it
is a consequence of Π2-sentences for τST ∪ {ω1} which hold assuming BPFA. One
such sentence is given by Caicedo and Velickovic in [6]:
∀C ladder system on ω1 ∀r ⊆ ω ∃α∃f [(f : ω1 → α is surjective) ∧ ψ(C, r, α)]
where ψ(x, y, z) is a Σ1-formula for τST∪{ω1} which can be used to define for each
ladder system C an injective map P (ω) → ω2 with assignment r 7→ α of the real
r to the ordinal α least such that ψ(C, r, α).
• The signature τNSω1 ∪ UB makes the Π1-theory of V invariant across the generic
multiverse (cfr. Thm. 6); hence we can use forcing to detect which Π2-sentences
should belong to the model companion of set theory in any signature τ ⊆ τNSω1 ∪
UB (if such a model companion exists); this is exactly the argument we used to
argue for ¬CH.
• (∗)-UB with a weak form of sharp for universally Baire sets can be equivalently
formulated as the assertion that the τNSω1 ∪UB-theory of V has as model compan-
ion the τNSω1 ∪UB-theory of Hω2 (cfr. Thm. 5). This brings to light the complete
accordance between the philosophy driving Pmax and bounded forcing axioms (that
of maximizing the Π2-sentences true in Hω2) with the notion of model companion-
ship.
Model companionship in set theory. Model companionship is a tameness notion which
must be handled with care (see Section 3.5). We believe that the present paper presents a
reasonable test to gauge the tameness of this notion: in set theory we are focusing mostly
in two types of structures: generic extensions V [G] of the universe of sets V produced
by (certain types of) forcings P , and the theory of H
V [G]
λ of these generic extensions for
suitably chosen (and definable) cardinals λ. We often study these structures working in
signatures τ maintaining that V ⊑ V [G] and H
V [G]
λ ≺1 V [G] also for τ (in particular here
and in a huge number of works one consider the case of τ being τNSω1 , P being a stationary
set preserving forcing, λ being ω2, or the case τ being σω, P being any forcing, λ being
ω1). The results of the present paper (and of its sequel) show that the axiomatization
of set theory+large cardinals in these signatures is well behaved: first of all the models
of its Π1-fragment include all the structures of interest, i.e. all generic extensions of V
(eventually obtained by forcing of a certain kind), and all the initial segments of these
generic extensions containing a large enough chunk of the universe. Moreover this theory
admits a model companion and this model companion is uniquely determined by the family
of Π2-sentences which we can provably force to hold in the appropriateH
V [G]
λ (with λ = ω1
or λ = ω2 decided by the signature). It has also to be noted that even the substructure
relation is not that much affected by forcing; for example any G V -generic for a stationary
set preserving forcing P maintains that V ⊑ V [G] also for the signature σω,NSω1 . (May be
surprisingly) Thm. 6 shows that if P is not stationary set preserving V ⊑ V [G] fails for
σω,NSω1 , nonetheless V and V [G] will satisfy exactly the same Π1-sentences for σω,NSω1 .
It is in our eyes surprising the perfect matching existing between generic absoluteness
results and the notion of model companionship which the present paper reveals.
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2. The theory of Hκ+ is the model companion of set theory
Notation 2.1. Given a ∈-structure (M,E) and τ a signature among τST, σκ, . . . , from
now we let (M, τM ) be the unique extension of (M,E) defined in accordance with Notation
2 and Fact 1. In particular (M, τM ) is a shorthand for (M,SM : S ∈ τ). If (N,E) is a
substructure of (M,E) we also write (N, τM ) as a shorthand for (N,SM ↾ N : S ∈ τ).
2.1. By-interpretability of the first order theory of Hκ+ with the first order
theory of P (κ). Let’s compare the first order theory of the structure
(P (κ) , SVφ : φ ∈ τST)
with that of the τST-theory of Hκ+ in models of ZFCST. We will show that they are ZFCτST -
provably by-interpretable with a by-interpetation translating Hκ+ in a Π1-definable subset
of P
(
κ2
)
and atomic predicates into Σ1-relations over this set. This result is the key to
the proof of Thm. 3 and it is just outlining the model theoretic consequences of the
well-known fact that sets can be coded by well-founded extensional graphs.
Definition 2.2. Given a ∈ Hκ+, R ∈ P
(
κ2
)
codes a, if R codes a well-founded extensional
relation on some α ≤ κ with top element 0 so that the transitive collapse mapping of (α,R)
maps 0 to a.
• WFEκ is the set of R ∈ P (κ) which are a well founded extensional relation with
domain α ≤ κ and top element 0.
• Codκ : WFEκ → Hκ+ is the map assigning a to R if and only if R codes a.
The following theorem shows that the structure (Hκ+ ,∈) is interpreted by means of
“imaginaries” in the structure (P (κ) , τV
ST
) by means of:
• a universal τST∪{κ}-formula (with quantifiers ranging over subsets of κ
<ω) defining
a set WFEκ ⊆ P
(
κ2
)
.
• an equivalence relation ∼=κ on WFEκ defined by an existential τST ∪ {κ}-formula
(with quantifiers ranging over subsets of κ<ω)
• A binary relation Eκ on WFEκ invariant under ∼=κ representing the ∈-relation as
the extension of an existential τST ∪ {κ}-formula (with quantifiers ranging over
subsets of κ<ω)13.
Theorem 2.3. Assume ZFC−κ . The following holds
14:
(1) The map Codκ andWFEκ are defined by ZFC
−
κ -provably ∆1-properties in parameter
κ. Moreover Codκ : WFEκ → Hκ+ is surjective (provably in ZFC
−
κ ), and WFEκ is
defined by a universal τST ∪ {κ}-formula with quantifiers ranging over subsets of
κ<ω.
(2) There are existential τST ∪ {κ}-formulae (with quantifiers ranging over subsets of
κ<ω), φ∈, φ= such that for all R,S ∈ WFEκ, φ=(R,S) if and only if Codκ(R) =
Codκ(S) and φ∈(R,S) if and only if Codκ(R) ∈ Codκ(S). In particular letting
Eκ = {(R,S) ∈WFEκ : φ∈(R,S)} ,
∼=κ= {(R,S) ∈WFEκ : φ=(R,S)} ,
∼=κ is a ZFC
−
κ -provably definable equivalence relation, Eκ respects it, and
(WFEκ/∼=κ , Eκ/∼=κ)
13See [9, Section 25] for proofs of the case κ = ω; in particular the statement and proof of Lemma 25.25
and the proof of [9, Thm. 13.28] contain all ideas on which one can elaborate to draw the conclusions of
Thm. 2.3.
14Many transitive supersets of Hκ+ are τST∪{κ}-model of ZFC
−
κ for κ an infinite cardinal (see [11, Section
IV.6]). To simplify notation we assume to have fixed a transitive τST ∪{κ}-model N of ZFC
−
κ with domain
N ⊇ Hκ+ . The reader can easily realize that all these statements holds for an arbitrary model N of ZFC
−
κ
replacing Hκ+ with its version according to N .
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is isomorphic to (Hκ+,∈) via the map [R] 7→ Codκ(R).
Proof. A detailed proof requires a careful examination of the syntactic properties of ∆0-
formulae, in line with the one carried in Kunen’s [11, Chapter IV]. We outline the main
ideas, following Kunen’s book terminology for certain set theoretic operations on sets,
functions and relations (such as dom(f), ran(f), Ext(R), etc). To simplify the notation,
we prove the results for a transitive model (N,∈) which is then extended to a structure
(N, τN
ST
, κN ) which models ZFC−κ , and whose domain contains Hκ+. The reader can verify
by itself that the argument is modular and works for any other model of ZFC−κ (transitive
or ill-founded, containing the “true” Hκ+ or not).
(1) This is proved in details in [11, Chapter IV]. To define WFEκ by a universal
property over subsets of κ and Codκ by a ∆1-property over Hκ+, we proceed as
follows:
• R is an extensional relation with domain contained in κ and top element 0 is
defined by the τST ∪ {κ}-atomic formula ψEXT(R) ZFC
−
κ -provably equivalent
to the ∆0(κ)-formula:
(R ⊆ κ2)∧
∧(Ext(R) ∈ κ ∨ Ext(R) = κ)∧
∧∀α, β ∈ Ext(R) [∀u ∈ Ext(R) (u R α↔ u R β)→ (α = β)]∧
∧∀α ∈ Ext(R)¬(0 R α).
• WFEκ is defined by the universal τST ∪ {κ}-formula φWFEκ(R) (quantifying
only over subsets of κ<ω)
ψEXT(R)∧
∧[∀f ⊆ κ2 (f is a function → ∃n ∈ ω ¬(〈f(n+ 1), f(n)〉 ∈ R))].
Its interpretation is the subset of P (κ<ω) of the σκ-symbol SφWFEκ .
• To define Codκ, consider the τST ∪ {κ}-atomic formula ψCod(G,R) provably
equivalent to the τST ∪ {κ}-formula:
ψEXT(R)∧
∧(G is a function)∧
∧(dom(G) = Ext(R))∧
∧∀α, β ∈ Ext(R) [α R β ↔ G(α) ∈ G(β)].
Then Codκ(R) = a can be defined either by the existential τST∪{κ}-formula
15
∃G (ψCod(G,R) ∧G(0) = a)
or by the universal τST ∪ {κ}-formula
∀G (ψCod(G,R)→ G(0) = a).
(2) The equality relation in Hκ+ is transferred to the isomorphism relation between
elements of WFEκ: if R,S are well-founded extensional on κ with a top-element,
the Mostowski collapsing theorem entails that Codκ(R) = Codκ(S) if and only
15Given an R such that ψEXT(R) holds, R is a well founded relation holds in a model of ZFC
−
κ if and
only if Codκ is defined on R. In the theory ZFC
−
κ , WFEκ can be defined using a universal property
by a τST ∪ {κ}-formula quantifying only over subsets of κ. On the other hand if we allow arbitrary
quantification over elements of Hκ+ , we can express the well-foundedness of R also using the existential
formula ∃GψCodκ(G,R). This is why WFEκ is defined by a universal τST ∪ {κ}-property in the structure
(P (κ) , τVST, κ), while the graph of Codκ can be defined by a ∆1-property for τST ∪ {κ} in the structure
(Hκ+ , τ
V
ST, κ
V ).
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if (Ext(R), R) ∼= (Ext(S), S). Isomorphism of the two structures (Ext(R), R) ∼=
(Ext(S), S) is expressed by the Σ1-formula for τκ:
φ=(R,S) ≡ ∃f (f is a bijection of κ onto κ and αRβ if and only if f(α)Sf(β)).
In particular we get that Sφ=(R,S) holds in Hκ+ for R,S ∈ WFEκ if and only if
Codκ(R) = Codκ(S).
Similarly one can express Codκ(R) ∈ Codκ(S) by the Σ1-property φ∈ in τκ
stating that (Ext(R), R) is isomorphic to (predS(α), S) for some α ∈ κ with α S 0,
where predS(α) is given by the elements of Ext(S) which are connected by a finite
path to α.
Moreover letting ∼=κ⊆WFE
2
κ denote the isomorphism relation between elements
of WFEκ and Eκ ⊆WFE
2
κ denote the relation which translates into the ∈-relation
via Codκ, it is clear that ∼=κ is a congruence relation over Eκ, i.e.: if R0 ∼=κ R1
and S0 ∼=κ S1, R0 Eκ S0 if and only if R1 Eκ S1.
This gives that the structure (WFEκ/∼=κ , Eκ/∼=κ) is isomorphic to (Hκ+,∈) via
the map [R] 7→ Codκ(R) (where WFEκ/∼=κ is the set of equivalence classes of
∼=κ
and the quotient relation [R] Eκ/∼=κ [S] holds if and only if R Eκ S).
This isomorphism is defined via the map Codκ, which is by itself defined by a
ZFC
−
κ -provably ∆1-property for τST ∪ {κ}.
The very definition of WFEκ,∼=κ, Eκ show that
WFEκ = S
N
φWFEκ
,
∼=κ= S
N
φWFEκ (x)∧φWFEκ (y)∧φ=(x,y)
,
Eκ = S
N
φWFEκ(x)∧φWFEκ(y)∧φ∈(x,y)
.

2.2. Model completeness for the theory of Hκ+.
Theorem 2.4. Any σκ-theory T extending
ZFC
∗−
κ ∪ {all sets have size κ}
is model complete.
Proof. To simplify notation, we conform to the assumption of the previous theorem, i.e.
we assume that the model (N,∈) which is uniquely extended to a model of ZFC∗−κ + every
set has size κ on which we work is a transitive superstructure of Hκ+.
The statement every set has size κ is satisified by a ZFC−κ -model (N, τ
V
ST
, κ) with N ⊇
H+κ if and only if N = Hκ+. From now on we proceed assuming this equality.
By Robinson’s test 3.14 it suffices to show that for all ∈-formulae φ(~x)
ZFC
−
κ + every set has size κ ⊢ ∀~x (φ(~x)↔ ψφ(~x)),
for some universal σκ-formula ψφ.
We will first define a recursive map φ → θφ which maps Σn-formulae φ for {∈, κ}
quantifying over all elements of Hκ+ to Σn+1-formulae θφ for τST ∪ {κ} whose quantifier
range just over subsets of κ<ω.
The proof of the previous theorem gave τST ∪ {κ}-formulae θx=y, θx∈y such that
S
Hκ+
θx=y
=∼=κ=
{
(R,S) ∈ (WFEκ)
2 : Codκ(R) = Codκ(S)
}
,
S
H
κ+
θx∈y
= Eκ =
{
(R,S) ∈ (WFEκ)
2 : Codκ(R) ∈ Codκ(S)
}
.
Specifically (following the notation of that proof)
θx=y = φWFEκ(x) ∧ φWFEκ(y) ∧ φ=(x, y),
θx∈y = φWFEκ(x) ∧ φWFEκ(y) ∧ φ∈(x, y).
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Now for any {∈, κ}-formula ψ(~x), we proceed to define the τST ∪ {κ}-formula θψ(~x)
letting:
• θψ∧ψ(~x) be θψ(~x) ∧ θψ(~x),
• θ¬ψ(~x) be ¬θψ(~x),
• θ∃yψ(y,~x)(~x) be ∃yθψ(y, ~x) ∧ φWFEκ(y).
An easy induction on the complexity of the τST ∪ {κ}-formulae θφ(~x) gives that for
any {∈, κ}-definable subset A of (Hκ+)
n which is the extension of some {∈, κ}-formula
φ(x1, . . . , xn)
{(R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ (WFEκ)
n : (Codκ(R1), . . . ,Codκ(Rn)) ∈ A} = S
Hκ+
θφ
,
with the further property that S
Hκ+
θφ
⊆ (WFEκ)
n respects the ∼=κ-relation
16.
Now every σκ-formula is ZFC
∗−
κ -equivalent to a {∈, κ}-formula
17.
Therefore we can extend φ 7→ θφ assigning to any σκ-formula φ(~x) the formula θψ(~x)
for some {∈, κ}-formula ψ(~x) which is ZFC∗−κ -equivalent to φ(~x).
Then for any {∈, κ}-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) Hκ+ |= φ(a1, . . . , an) if and only if
(WFEκ/∼=κ , Eκ/∼=κ) |= φ([R1], . . . , [Rn])
with Codκ(Ri) = ai for i = 1, . . . , n if and only if
Hκ+ |= ∀R1, . . . , Rn [(
n∧
i=1
Codκ(Ri) = ai)→ θφ(R1, . . . , Rn)]
if and only if
Hκ+ |= ∀R1, . . . , Rn [(
n∧
i=1
Codκ(Ri) = ai)→ Sθφ(R1, . . . , Rn)].
Since this argument can be repeated verbatim for any model of ZFC∗−κ +every set has
size κ, and any σκ-formula is ZFC
∗−
κ -equivalent to a {∈, κ}-formula, we have proved the
following:
Claim 1. For any σκ-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn), ZFC
∗−
κ +every set has size κ proves that
∀x1, . . . , xn [φ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ∀y1, . . . , yn [(
n∧
i=1
Codκ(yi) = xi)→ Sθφ(y1, . . . , yn)]].
But Codκ(y) = x is expressible by an existential τST ∪{κ}-formula provably in ZFC
−
κ ⊆
ZFC
∗−
κ , therefore
∀y1, . . . , yn [(
n∧
i=1
Codκ(yi) = xi)→ Sθφ(y1, . . . , yn)]
is a universal σκ-formula, and we are done. 
16It is also clear from our argument that the map φ 7→ θφ is recursive (and a careful inspection reveals
that it maps a Σn-formula to a Σn+1-formula).
17The map assigning to any σκ-formula a ZFC
∗−
κ -equivalent {∈, κ}-formula can also be chosen to be
recursive.
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2.3. Proof of Thm. 3. We can immediately prove Thm. 3.
Proof. By Thm. 2.3, any theory extending
ZFC
∗−
κ + every set has size κ
is model complete. Therefore so is
T ∗ = T∀ ∪ ZFC
∗−
κ + every set has size κ.
We need to show that T ∗ is the model companion of T , and that T ∗ = T ∗i for i = 0, 1
where
T ∗0 =
{
ψ : ψ is a Π2-sentence for σκ and T ⊢ ψ
Hκ+
}
,
and T ∗1 is the set of Π2-sentences φ such that
For all Π1-sentences θ for τ T∀+φ is consistent if and only if so is T∀+φ+θ.
T ∗ is the model companion of T : By Lemma 3.19(1). It suffices to verify that for
every model M of T , HM
κ+
is a Σ1-elementary substructure of M which models
T ∗. But this holds true by Lemma 4.1. Therefore T ∗ is a model companion for T .
T ∗1 = T
∗: By Lemma 3.19(3) the model companion of T is axiomatized by T ∗1 .
T ∗0 = T
∗: First assume ψ is a Π2-sentence in T
∗ and M models T . We must show that
HM
κ+
models ψ. But this is the case since HM
κ+
models T ∗.
Conversely assume ψ is a Π2-sentence for σκ which holds in any H
M
κ+
for M
a model of T . We must show that ψ ∈ T ∗. We show that ψ ∈ T ∗1 : (using
Lemma 3.19(2)) it suffices to show that S∀ ∪ {ψ} is consistent for any consistent
S ⊇ T : fix M a model of S; by assumption HM
κ+
models ψ; by Lemma 4.1 applied
to M, we get that HM
κ+
models S∀; we conclude that S∀ ∪ {ψ} is consistent.
The proof is completed. 
Remark 2.5. Thm. 3 can be proved for many other signatures other than σκ. It suffices
that the signature in question adds new predicates just for definable subsets of P (κ)n,
and also that it adds family of predicates which are closed under definability (i.e. pro-
jections, complementation, finite unions, permutations) and under the map Codκ. Under
these assumptions we can still use Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 3.19 to argue for the evident
declination of Thm. 3 to this set up. However linking it to generic absoluteness results as
we did in Theorem 1 requires much more care in the definition of the signature. We will
pursue this matter in more details in the next section and in a follow-up of this paper.
2.4. A weak version of Theorem 2. Let ZFC∗ω1 ⊇ ZFCST be the σω1 = σω ∪{κ}-theory
obtained adding axioms which force in each of its σω1-models κ to be interpreted by the
first uncountable cardinal, and each predicate symbol Sφ to be interpreted as the subset
of P (ω<ω1 )
n
defined by φP(ω
<ω
1 )(x1, . . . , xn) (see again Notation 2 and Fact 1 for details).
Theorem 4. Let T be a σω1-theory extending ZFC
∗
ω1
with the ∈-sentence:
There are class many superhuge cardinals,
and such that T +MM+++ is consistent.
TFAE for any Π2-sentence ψ for σω1:
(1) For all universal σω1-sentences θ such that T + θ is consistent, so is T∀ + θ + ψ;
(2) T + MM+++ proves that some stationary set preserving forcing notion P forces
ψH˙ω2 +MM+++;
(3) T +MM+++ ⊢ ψHω2 .
See Remarks 2.6(4) for some information on MM+++, and 2.6(3) for informations on
superhugeness.
The proof of Theorem 4 is a trivial variation of the proof of Theorem 1:
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Proof. [16, Thm. 5.18] gives that 4(3) and 4(2) are equivalent. Theorem 3 establishes the
equivalence of 4(3) and 4(1). 
Remark 2.6.
(1) Note that ZFC∗ω1 is more expressive than ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
. The former adds predicate
symbols for all subsets of P (ω<ω1 )
k
defined by φP(ω
<ω
1 )(x1, . . . , xk) as φ ranges
over the ∈-formulae. The latter adds predicate symbols for all subsets of P (ω<ω)k
defined by φP(ω
<ω)(x1, . . . , xk) as φ ranges over the ∈-formulae and a unique pred-
icate symbol for the subset of P (ω1) given by the non-stationary ideal.
More precisely for any model M = (M,E) of ZFC, if M0 is the unique exten-
sion of M to a σω1-model of ZFC
∗
ω1
, and M1 is the unique extension of M to
a σω,NSω1 -model of ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
, we get that RM0ψ = R
M1
ψ and f
M0
ψ = f
M1
ψ for
all bounded formulae ψ, ωM0 = ωM1 , ωM01 = ω
M1
1 , but for any τST-formula φ,
SM1φ = S
M0
φP(ω
<ω) .
(2) A key distinction between the signatures σω1 and σω,NSω1 is that (assuming large
cardinals) CH cannot be T -equivalent to a Σ1-sentence
18 in σω,NSω1 for any T as
in the assumptions of Thm. 2, while it is ZFCω1-equivalent to an atomic σω1-
sentence19. ¬CH is the simplest example of the type of Π2-sentences which exem-
plifies why Thm. 4(2) must be weakened with respect to Thm. 2(2) and why Thm.
2 needs a different proof strategy than the one we use here to establish Theorems
1 and 4 (see for details 7 below). On the other hand the family of Π2-sentences
ψ to which Theorem 4 applies is larger than the ones considered in Theorem 2
because the signature σω1 is more expressive than σω,NSω1 (as shown by the case
for CH).
(3) δ is superhuge if it supercompact and this can be witnessed by huge embeddings.
A superhuge cardinal is consistent relative to the existence of a 2-huge cardinal.
(4) For a definition of MM+++ see [16, Def. 5.19]. We just note that MM+++ is
a natural strengthening of (∗)-UB (by the recent breakthrough of Aspero` and
Schindler [1]) and of Martin’s maximum (for example any of the standard iterations
to produce a model of Martin’s maximum produce a model of MM+++ if the
iteration has length a superhuge cardinal [16, Thm 5.29]).
(5) We can prove exactly the same results of Thm. 4 replacing (verbatim in its state-
ment)MM+++ by any of the axioms RAω(Γ) introduced in [4] or the axioms CFA(Γ)
introduced in [3]; in item 4(2) stationary set preserving forcing notion P must be
replaced by P ∈ Γ.
(6) We consider Thm. 4 weaker than Thm. 2, because in Thm. 2 one can choose
the theory T to be inconsistent with MAX(UB) + (∗)-UB without hampering its
conclusion (for example T could satisfy CH, a statement denied by (∗)-UB), and
because 2(2) holds for all forcing notions P . The key point separating these two
results is that the signature σω1 is too expressive and renders many statements
incompatible with forcing axioms formalizable by existential (or even atomic) σω1-
sentences (for example such is the case for CH).
(7) We can also give a detailed explanation of why we cannot use Thm. 3 to prove
Thm. 2 as we did for Theorems 1 and 4. The key point is that the model companion
18By Thm. 6.
19Following the notation to be introduced in Section 2, CH can be expressed as the τST ∪ {ω1}-sentence
quantifying just over subsets of P
(
ω<ω1
)
:
∃R ⊆ P
(
ω<ω1
)
[WFEω1(R) ∧ ∀S ⊆ P
(
ω<ω1
)
[(WFEω1(S) ∧ Ext(S) = ω)↔ S Eω1 R]].
The latter is equivalent to a σω1 -sentence in ZFC
∗
ω1 .
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T ∗ of some T ⊇ ZFCω1,NSω1+there are class many Woodin may not be axiomatized
by the set T ∗∗ of Π2-sentences ψ for σω,NSω1 such that T ⊢ ψ
Hω2 , and this is what
we used in the proofs of Theorems 1, 4.
For example this is the case for the theory T = ZFCω1,NSω1 + CH+there are
class many Woodin: By Remark 1(5) CH is expressible by the Σ2-sentence in
τω1 ∪ {NSω1} ψCH, which shows that (in view of Levy Absoluteness) CH and
CH
Hω2 are T -equivalent. Now ¬CH is in the Kaiser hull of T (which is a subset of
T ∗) being a Π2-sentence compatible with S∀ for any complete S ⊇ T in view of
Thm. 6 and Fact 3.12.
3. Existentially closed structures, model completeness, model
companionship
We present this topic expanding on [14, Sections 3.1-3.2]. We decided to include detailed
proofs since their presentation is (in some occasions) rather sketchy, and their focus is not
exactly ours.
The first objective is to isolate necessary and sufficient conditions granting that some
τ -structure M embeds into some model of some τ -theory20 T .
Definition 3.1. Given τ -theories T, S, a τ -sentence ψ separates T from S if T ⊢ ψ and
S ⊢ ¬ψ.
T is Πn-separated from S if some Πn-sentence for τ separates T from S.
Lemma 3.2. Assume S, T are τ -theories. TFAE:
(1) T is not Π1-separated from S (i.e. no universal sentence ψ is such that T ⊢ ψ and
S ⊢ ¬ψ).
(2) There is some τ -model M of S which can be embedded in some τ -model N of T .
See also [14, Lemma 3.1.1, Lemma 3.1.2, Thm. 3.1.3]
Proof. We assume T, S are closed under logical consequences.
(2) implies (1): By contraposition we prove ¬(1)→ ¬(2).
Assume some universal sentence ψ separates T from S. Then for any model of
T , all its substructures model ψ, therefore they cannot be models of S.
(1) implies (2): By contraposition we prove ¬(2)→ ¬(1).
Assume that for any model M of S and N of T M 6⊑ N . We must show that
T is Π1-separated from S.
Given a τ -structure M which models S, let ∆0(M) be the atomic diagram of
M in the signature τ ∪M.
The theory T ∪∆0(M) is inconsistent, otherwise M embeds into some model
of T : let Q¯ be a τ ∪M-model of ∆0(M) ∪ T and Q be the τ -structure obtained
from Q¯ omitting the interpretation of the constants not in τ . Clearly Q models
T . The interpretation of the constants in τ ∪M inside Q¯ defines a τ -substructure
of Q isomorphic to M.
By compactness (since ∆0(M) is closed under finite conjunctions) there is a
quantifier free τ -formula ψM(~x) and ~a ∈ M
<ω such that T+ψM(~a) is inconsistent.
This gives that T ⊢ ¬ψM(~a). Since ~a is a family of constants never occurring in
T , we get that T ⊢ ∀~x¬ψM(~x) and M |= ∃~xψM(~x).
The theory
S ∪ {¬∃~xψM(~x) :M |= S}
is inconsistent, since ¬∃~xψM(~x) fails in any model M of S.
20In what follows we conform to Notation 2.1 and feel free to confuse a τ -structureM = (M, τM) with its
domain M and an ordered tuple ~a ∈ M<ω with its set of elements. Moreover we often write M |= φ(~a)
rather than M |= φ(~x)[~x/~a] when M is τ -structure ~a ∈M<ω, φ is a τ -formula.
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By compactness there is a finite set of formulae ψM1 . . . ψMk such that
S +
∧
{¬∃~xiψMi(~xi) : i = 1, . . . , k}
is inconsistent. This gives that
S ⊢
k∨
i=1
∃~xiψMi(~xi).
The τ -sentence ψ :=
∨k
i=1 ∃~xiψMi(~xi) holds in all models of S and its negation∧
{¬∃~xiψMi(~xi) : i = 1, . . . , k}
is a conjunction of universal sentences derivable from T . Hence ¬ψ separates T
from S.

The following Lemma shows that models of T∀ can always be extended to superstruc-
tures which model T .
Lemma 3.3. Let T be a τ -theory and M be a τ -structure. TFAE:
(1) M is a τ -model of T∀.
(2) There exists N ⊒M which models T .
Proof. (2) implies (1) is trivial.
Conversely let ∆0(M) be the τ ∪M-theory given by the atomic diagram of M.
Claim 2. T is not Π1-separated from ∆0(M) (in the signature τ ∪M).
Proof. If not there are ~a ∈ M<ω, and a quantifier free τ -formula φ(~x, ~z) such that
T ⊢ ∀~zφ(~a, ~z),
while
∆0(M) ⊢ ¬∀~zφ(~a, ~z).
The latter yields that
∆0(M) ⊢ ∃~x∃~z¬φ(~x, ~z),
and therefore also that
M |= ∃~x∃~z¬φ(~x, ~z).
On the other hand, since the constants ~a do not appear in any of the sentences in T ,
we also get that
T ⊢ ∀~x∀~zφ(~x, ~z).
This is a contradiction since M models T∀. 
By the Claim and Lemma 3.2 some τ ∪M-model P¯ of ∆0(M) embeds into some τ ∪M-
model Q¯ of T . Let Q be the τ -structure obtained from Q¯ omitting the interpretation of the
constants not in τ . Then Q models T and contains a substructure isomorphic to M. 
Corollary 3.4 (Resurrection Lemma). Assume M≺1 N are τ -structures. Then there is
Q ⊒ N which is an elementary extension of M.
Proof. Let T be the elementary diagram ∆ω(M) of M in the signature τ ∪M. It is easy
to check that any model of T when restricted to the signature τ is an elementay extension
of M. Since M ≺1 N , the natural extension of N to a τ ∪ M-structure realizes the
Π1-fragment of T in the signature τ ∪M. Now apply the previous Lemma. 
The Resurrection Lemma motivates the resurrection axioms introduced by Hamkins
and Johnstone in [7], and their iterated versions introduced by the author and Audrito
in [4].
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3.1. Existentially closed structures. The objective is now to isolate the “generic”
models of some universal theory T (i.e. all axioms of T are universal sentences). These
are described by the T -existentially closed models.
Definition 3.5. Given a first order signature τ , let T be any consistent τ -theory. A
τ -structure M is T -existentially closed (T -ec) if
(1) M can be embedded in a model of T .
(2) M≺Σ1 N for all N ⊒M which are models of T .
In general T -ec models need not be models21 of T , but only of their universal fragment.
A standard diagonalization argument shows that for any theory T there are T -ec models,
see Lemma 3.8 below or [14, Lemma 3.2.11].
A trivial observation which will come handy in the sequel is the following:
Fact 3.6. Assume M is a T -ec model and S ⊇ T is such that some N ⊒ M models S.
Then M is S-ec.
Proposition 3.7. Assume a τ -structure M is T -ec. Then:
(1) M |= T∀.
(2) M is also T∀-ec.
(3) If N ≺Σ1 M, then N is also T -ec.
(4) Let ∀~x∃~yψ(~x, ~y,~a) be a Π2-sentence with ψ(~x, ~y, ~z) quantifier free τ -formula and
parameters ~a in M<ω. Assume it holds in some N ⊒M which models T∀, then it
holds in M.
(5) Let S be the τ -theory of M. For any Π2-sentence ψ in the signature τ TFAE:
• ψ holds in some model of S∀.
• ψ holds in M.
Proof.
(1): There is at least one super-structure of M which models T , and any ψ ∈ T∀ holds in
this superstructure, hence in M.
(2): Assume M⊑ P for some model P of T∀. We must argue that M≺1 P.
By Lemma 3.3, there is Q ⊒ P which models T .
Since M and Q are both models of T and M is T -ec, we get the following
diagram:
M Q
P
Σ1
⊑⊑
Then any Σ1-formula ψ(~a) with ~a ∈ M
<ω realized in P holds in Q, and is therefore
reflected to M. We are done by Tarski-Vaught’s criterion.
(3): Assume N ⊑ P for some model of T∀ P. Let ∆0(P) be the atomic diagram of P in
the signature τ ∪ P ∪M and ∆0(M) be the atomic diagram of M in the same
signature22.
Claim 3. T∀ ∪∆0(P) ∪∆0(M) is a consistent τ ∪M∪ P-theory.
21For example let T be the theory of commutative rings with no zero divisors which are not fields in the
signature (+, ·, 0, 1). Then the T -ec structures are exactly all the algebraically closed fields, and no T -ec
model is a model of T . By Thm. 3 (Hω1 , σ
V
ω ) is S-ec for S the σω-theory of V , but it is not a model of S:
the Π2-sentence asserting that every set has countable transitive closure is true in (Hω1 , σ
V
ω ) but denied
by S.
22We are considering P ∪M as the union of the domains of the structure P ,M amalgamated over N ; in
particular we add a new constant for each element of P \N , a new constant for each element of M\N , a
new constant for each element of N .
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Proof. Assume not. Find ~a ∈ (P \N )<ω, ~b ∈ (M\N )<ω , ~c ∈ N<ω and τ -formulae
ψ0(~x, ~z), ψ1(~y, ~z) such that:
• ψ0(~a,~c) ∈ ∆0(P),
• ψ1(~b,~c) ∈ ∆0(M),
• T ∪
{
ψ0(~a,~c), ψ1(~b,~c)
}
is inconsistent.
Then
T ⊢ ¬ψ0(~a,~c) ∨ ¬ψ1(~b,~c).
Since the constants appearing in ~a,~b,~c are never appearing in sentences of T , we
get that
T ⊢ ∀~z (∀~x¬ψ0(~x, ~z)) ∨ (∀~y¬ψ1(~y, ~z)).
Since P models T∀, and
P |= ψ0(~x, ~z)[~x/~a, ~z/~c],
we get that
P |= ∀~y¬ψ1(~y,~c).
Therefore
N |= ∀~y¬ψ1(~y,~c)
being a substructure of P, and so does M since N ≺1 M. This contradicts
ψ1(~b,~c) ∈ ∆0(M). 
If Q¯ is a model realizing T∀∪∆0(P)∪∆0(M), and Q is the τ -structure obtained
forgetting the constant symbols not in τ , we get that:
• P and M are both substructures of Q containing N as a common substruc-
ture;
• N ≺1 M≺1 Q, since Q realizes T∀ and M is T∀-ec.
We can now conclude that if a Σ1-formula ψ(~c) for τ ∪ N with parameters in N
holds in P, it holds in Q as well (since Q ⊒ P), and therefore also in N (since
N ≺1 Q).
(4): Observe that for all ~b ∈M<ω, ∃~y ψ(~b, ~y,~a) holds in N , and therefore in M, sinceM
is T -ec; hence M |= ∀~x∃~yψ(~x, ~y,~a).
(5): First of all note that M is S-ec since S ⊇ T (by Fact 3.6). By Lemma 3.3 (applied
to S∀+ψ andM) any Π2-sentence ψ for τ which holds in some model of S∀ holds
in some model of S∀ which is a superstructure of M. Now apply 4.

In particular a structure is T -ec if and only if it is T∀-ec, and a T -ec structure realizes
all Π2-sentences which are consistent with its Π1-theory.
We now show that any structureM can always be extended to a T -ec structure for any
T which is not separated from the Π1-theory of M.
Lemma 3.8. [14, Lemma 3.2.11] Given a first order τ -theory T , any model of T∀ can be
extended to a τ -superstructure which is T -ec.
Proof. Given a model M of T , we construct an ascending chain of T∀-models as follows.
Enumerate all quantifier free τ -formulae as {φα(y, ~xα) : α < |τ |}. Let M0 =M have size
κ ≥ |τ |+ ℵ0. Fix also some enumeration
π :κ→ |τ | × κ2
α 7→ (π0(α), π1(α), π2(α))
such that π2(α) ≤ α for all α < κ and for each ξ < |τ |, and η, β < κ there are unboundedly
many α < κ such that π(α) = (ξ, η, β).
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Let now Mη with enumeration
{
~mξη : ξ < κ
}
of M<ωη be given for all η ≤ β. If Mβ is
T -ec, stop the construction. Else check whether T∀∪∆0(Mβ)∪
{
∃yφπ0(α)(y, ~m
π1(α)
π2(α)
)
}
is a
consistent τ∪Mβ-theory; if so letMβ+1 have size κ and realize this theory. At limit stages
γ, let Mγ be the direct limit of the chain of τ -structures {Mβ : β < γ}. Then all Mξ are
models of T∀, and at some stage β ≤ κ Mβ is T∀-ec (hence also T -ec), since all existential
τ -formulae with parameters in some Mη will be considered along the construction, and
realized along the way if this is possible, and all Mη are always models of T∀ (at limit
stages the ascending chain of T∀-models remains a T∀-model). 
Compare the above construction with the standard consistency proofs of bounded forc-
ing axioms as given for example in [2, Section 2]. In the latter case to preserve T∀ at limit
stages we use iteration theorems23.
3.2. The Kaiser hull of a first order theory. The Kaiser Hull of a theory T describes
the smallest elementary class containing all the “generic” structures for T . For most
theories T the models of the respective Kaiser hulls realize exactly all Π2-sentences which
are consistent with the universal fragment of any extension of T .
Definition 3.9. [14, Lemma 3.2.12, Lemma 3.2.13] Given a theory T in a signature τ ,
its Kaiser hull KH(T ) is given by the Π2-sentences of τ which holds in all T -ec structures.
Definition 3.10. A τ -theory T is Πn-complete, if it is consistent and for any Πn-sentence
either φ ∈ T or ¬φ ∈ T .
By Proposition 3.7.5 we get:
Fact 3.11. Given a Π1-complete first order τ -theory T , its Kaiser Hull is a Π2-complete
τ -theory defined by the request that for any Π2-sentence ψ
ψ ∈ KH(T ) if and only if {ψ} ∪ T∀ is consistent.
In particular any model of the Kaiser hull of a Π1-complete T realizes simultaneously
all Π2-sentences which are individually consistent with T∀.
For theories T of interests to us their Kaiser hull can be described in the same terms,
but the proof is much more delicate. We start with the following weaker property which
holds for arbitrary theories:
Fact 3.12. Given a τ -theory T , its Kaiser hull KH(T ) contains the set of Π2-sentences
ψ for τ such that for all complete S ⊇ T , S∀ ∪ {ψ} is consistent.
Proof. Assume ψ is a Π2-sentence such that for all complete S ⊇ T , S∀∪{ψ} is consistent.
We must show that ψ holds in all T -ec models.
Fix M an existentially closed model for T (it exists by Lemma 3.8); we must show
that M |= ψ. Let N ⊒ M be a model of T and S be the τ -theory of N . Then S is a
complete theory and M |= S∀ since M ≺1 N (being T -ec). Since S ⊇ T , M is also S-ec
(by Fact 3.6). Since S∀ ∪ {ψ} is consistent, and S∀ is Π1-complete, we obtain that M
models ψ, being an S∀-ec model, and using Fact 3.11. 
We will show in Lemma 3.19 that the set of Π2-sentences described in the Fact provides
an equivalent characterization of the Kaiser hull for many theories admitting a model
companion, among which those considered in the previous sections.
23Assume G is V -generic for a forcing which is a limit of an iteration of length ω of forcings {Pn : n < ω}.
In general H
V [G]
ω2 is not given by the union of H
V [G∩Pn]
ω2 , hence a subtler argument is needed to maintain
that H
V [G]
ω2 preserves T∀.
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3.3. Model completeness. It is possible (depending on the choice of the theory T ) that
there are models of the Kaiser hull of T which are not T -ec24. Robinson has come up with
two model theoretic properties (model completeness and model companionship) which
describe the case in which the models of the Kaiser hull of T are exactly the class of T -ec
models (even in case T is not a complete theory).
Definition 3.13. A τ -theory T is model complete if for all τ -models M and N of T we
have that M⊑ N implies M≺ N .
Remark that theories admitting quantifier elimination are automatically model com-
plete. On the other hand model complete theories need not be complete25. However
for theories T which are Π1-complete, model completeness entails completeness: any two
models of a Π1-complete, model complete T share the same Π1-theory, therefore if T1 ⊇ T
and T2 ⊇ T with Mi a model of Ti, we can suppose (by Lemma 3.2) that M1 ⊑ M2.
Since they are both models of T , model completeness entails that M1 ≺M2.
Lemma 3.14. [14, Lemma 3.2.7] (Robinson’s test) Let T be a τ -theory. The following
are equivalent:
(a) T is model complete.
(b) Any model of T is T -ec.
(c) Each existential τ -formula φ(~x) in free variables ~x is T -equivalent to a universal
τ -formula ψ(~x) in the same free variables.
(d) Each τ -formula φ(~x) in free variables ~x is T -equivalent to a universal τ -formula
ψ(~x) in the same free variables.
Remark that (d) (or (c)) shows that being a model complete τ -theory T is expressible
by a ∆0(τ, T )-property in any model of ZFC, hence it is absolute with respect to forcing.
Proof.
(a) implies (b): Immediate.
(b) implies (c): Fix an existential formula φ(~x) in free variables x1, . . . , xn. Let Γ be
the set of universal formulae θ(~x) such that
T ⊢ ∀~x (φ(~x)→ θ(~x)).
Note that Γ is closed under finite conjunctions and disjunctions. Let ~c = (c1, . . . , cn)
be a finite set of new constant symbols and Γ(~c) = {θ(~c) : θ(~x) ∈ Γ}.
It suffices to prove
(2) T ∪ Γ(~c) |= φ(~c);
if this is the case, by compactness, a finite subset Γ0(~c) of Γ(~c) is such that
T ∪ Γ0(~c) |= φ(~c);
letting θ¯(~x) :=
∧
{ψ(~x) : ψ(~c) ∈ Γ0(~c)}, the latter gives that
T |= ∀~x (θ¯(~x)→ φ(~x))
(since the constants ~c do not appear in T ).
θ¯(~x) ∈ Γ is a universal formula witnessing (c) for φ(~x).
So we prove (2):
Proof. Let M be a τ ∪ {c1, . . . , cn}-model of T ∪ Γ(~c). We must show that M
models φ(~c).
The key step is to prove the following:
24This is the main issue we face in the proof of Thm. 2: we cannot prove that the theory T in its assumption
has a model companion, we will only be able to compute that its Kaiser hull is described by 2(3).
25For example the theory of algebraically closed fields is model complete, but algebraically closed fields of
different characteristics are elementarily inequivalent.
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Claim 4. T ∪∆0(M)∪{φ(~c)} is consistent (where ∆0(M) is the τ ∪{c1, . . . , cn}-
atomic diagram of M).
Assume the Claim holds and let N realize the above theory. Then
M⊑ N ↾ (τ ∪ {~c}).
Hence
M ↾ τ ⊑ N ↾ τ.
By (b)
M ↾ τ ≺1 N ↾ τ.
Now let b1, . . . , bn ∈ M be the interpretations of c1, . . . , cn. Then
N ↾ τ |= φ(b1, . . . , bn).
Since φ(~x) is Σ1 for τ , we get that
M ↾ τ |= φ(b1, . . . , bn),
hence
M |= φ(c1, . . . , cn),
and we are done.
So we are left with the proof of the Claim.
Proof. Let ψ(~x, ~y) be a quantifier free τ -formula such that ψ(~c,~a) ∈ ∆0(M) for
some ~a ∈ M.
Clearly M models ∃~yψ(~c, ~y).
Then the universal formula ¬∃~yψ(~c, ~y) 6∈ Γ(~c), sinceM models its negation and
Γ(~c) at the same time.
This gives that
T 6⊢ ∀~x (φ(~x)→ ¬∃~yψ(~x, ~y)),
i.e.
T ∪ {∃~x [φ(~x) ∧ ∃~yψ(~x, ~y)]}
is consistent.
We conclude that
T ∪ {φ(~c) ∧ ψ(~c,~a)}
is consistent for any tuple a1, . . . , ak ∈ M and formula ψ such that M models
ψ(~c,~a) (since ~c,~a are constants never appearing in the formulae of T ).
This shows that T ∪∆0(M) ∪ {φ(~c)} is consistent. 
(2) is proved. 
(c) implies (d): We prove by induction on n that Πn-formulae and Σn-formulae are T -
equivalent to a Π1-formula.
(c) gives the base case n = 1 of the induction for Σ1-formulae and (trivially) for
Π1-formulae.
Assuming we have proved the implication for all Σn formulae for some fixed
n > 0, we obtain it for Πn+1-formulae ∀~xψ(~x, ~y) (with ψ(~x, ~y) Σn) applying the
inductive assumptions to ψ(~x, ~y); next we observe that a Σn+1-formula is equivalent
to the negation of a Πn+1-formula, which is in turn equivalent to the negation of a
universal formula (by what we already argued), which is equivalent to an existential
formula, and thus equivalent to a universal formula (by (c)).
(d) implies (a): By (d) every formula is T -equivalent both to a universal formula and to
an existential formula (since its negation is T -equivalent to a universal formula).
This gives that M ≺ N whenever M ⊑ N are models of T , since truth of
universal formulae is inherited by substructures, while truth of existential formulae
pass to superstructures.
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
We will also need the following:
Fact 3.15. Let τ be a signature and T a model complete τ -theory. Let σ ⊇ τ be a signature
and T ∗ ⊇ T a σ-theory such that every σ-formula is T ∗-equivalent to a τ -formula. Then
T ∗ is model complete.
Proof. By the model completeness of T and the assumptions on T ∗ we get that every
σ-formula is equivalent to a Π1-formula for τ ⊆ σ. We conclude by Robinson’s test. 
We will later show that model complete theories are the Kaiser hull of their univer-
sal fragment. This will be part of a broad family of tameness properties for first order
theories which require a new concept in order to be properly formulated, that of model
companionship.
3.4. Model companionship. Model completeness comes in pairs with another funda-
mental concept which generalizes to arbitrary first order theories the relation existing
between algebraically closed fields and commutative rings without zero-divisors. As a
matter of fact, the case described below occurs when T ∗ is the theory of algebraically
closed fields and T is the theory of commutative rings with no zero divisors.
Definition 3.16. Given two theories T and T ∗ in the same language τ , T ∗ is the model
companion of T if the following conditions holds:
(1) Each model of T can be extended to a model of T ∗.
(2) Each model of T ∗ can be extended to a model of T .
(3) T ∗ is model complete.
Different theories can have the same model companion, for example the theory of fields
and the theory of commutative rings with no zero-divisors which are not fields both have
the theory of algebraically closed fields as their model companion.
Theorem 3.17. [14, Thm 3.2.14] Let T be a first order theory. If its model companion
T ∗ exists, then
(1) T∀ = T
∗
∀ .
(2) T ∗ is the theory of the existentially closed models of T∀.
Proof.
(1) By Lemma 3.3.
(2) By Robinson’s test 3.14 T ∗ is the theory realized exactly by the T ∗-ec models; by
Proposition 3.7(2) M is T ∗-ec if and only if it is T ∗∀ -ec; by (1) T
∗
∀ = T∀.

An immediate by-product of the above Theorem is that the model companion of a
theory does not necessarily exist, but, if it does, it is unique and is its Kaiser hull.
Theorem 3.18. [14, Thm. 3.2.9] Assume T has a model companion T ∗. Then T ∗ is
axiomatized by its Π2-consequences and is the Kaiser hull of T∀.
Moreover T ∗ is the unique model companion of T and is characterized by the property
of being the unique model complete theory S such that S∀ = T∀.
Proof. For quantifier free formulae ψ(~x, ~y) and φ(~x, ~y) the assertion
∀~x [∃~yψ(~x, ~y)↔ ∀~yφ(~x, ~y)]
is a Π2-sentence.
Let T ∗∗ be the theory given by the Π2-consequences of T
∗.
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Since T ∗ is model complete, by Robinson’s test 3.14(c), for any Σ1-formula ∃~yψ(~x, ~y)
there is a universal formula ∀~yφ(~x, ~y) such that
∀~x [∃~yψ(~x, ~y)↔ ∀~yφ(~x, ~y)]
is in T ∗∗.
Again by Robinson’s test 3.14(c) T ∗∗ is model complete.
Now assume S is a model complete theory such that S∀ = T∀ Clearly T
∗
∀ = T
∗∗
∀ = T∀.
By Robinson’s test 3.14(b) and Proposition 3.7(2), S∀ holds exactly in the T∀-ec models.
Hence T ∗ = T ∗∗ since T ∗∀ = T
∗∗
∀ .
This shows that any model complete theory is axiomatized by its Π2-consequences,
that the model companion T ∗ of T is unique, that T ∗ is also the Kaiser hull of T (being
axiomatized by the Π2-sentences which hold in all T -ec-models), and is characterized by
the propoerty of being the unique model complete theory S such that T∀ = S∀. 
Thm. 3.18 provides an equivalent characterization of model companion theories (which
is expressible by a ∆0-property in parameters T and T
∗, hence absolute for transitive
models of ZFC).
We use the following criteria for model companionship in the proofs of Theorems 1, 4,
3.
Lemma 3.19. Let T, T0 be τ -theories with T0 model complete. Assume that for every
complete τ -theory S ⊇ T there is M which models T0 + S∀. Then:
(1) T ∗ = T0 + T∀ is the model companion of T .
(2) T ∗ is axiomatized by the the set of Π2-sentences ψ for τ such that S∀ ∪ {ψ} is
consistent for all complete S ⊇ T .
(3) T ∗ is axiomatized by the the set of Π2-sentences ψ for τ such that for all universal
τ -sentences θ T∀ + θ + ψ is consistent if and only if so is T∀ + θ.
Proof. By Fact 3.15 T ∗ is model complete.
(1) We need to show that any model of T ∗ embeds into a model of T and conversely.
Assume N models T ∗. Then N models T∀. By Lemma 3.3 there exists M⊒ N
which models T .
Conversely let M model T and S be the τ -theory of M. By assumption there
is N which models T0 + S∀ (but this N may not be a superstructure of M). Let
S∗ be the τ -theory of N . Then S∗∀ = S∀, since S∀ and S
∗
∀ are Π1-complete theories
with S∗∀ ⊇ S∀. Moreover S
∗ ⊇ T ∗, since S∀ ⊇ T∀.
Claim 5. The τ ∪M-theory S∗ ∪∆0(M) is consistent.
Assume the Claim holds, thenM is a τ -substructure of a model of S∗ ⊇ T ∗ and
we are done.
Proof. If not there is ψ(~a) ∈ ∆0(M) such that S
∗ ∪ {ψ(~a)} is inconsistent. This
gives that
S∗ ⊢ ¬ψ(~a).
Since none of the constant in ~a occurs in τ , we get that
S∗ ⊢ ∀~x¬ψ(~x),
i.e. ∀~x¬ψ(~x) ∈ S∗∀ = S∀. But M models S∀ and ∀~x¬ψ(~x) fails in M; a contradic-
tion. 
(2) Assume ψ ∈ T ∗ and S is a complete extension of T , we must show that S∀ + ψ is
consistent. By assumption there is N which models T ∗ + S∀, and we are done.
(3) Left to the reader.

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Remark 3.20. We do not know whether the characterization of the model companion of T
given in Lemma 3.19(3) can be proved for all theories T admitting a model companion:
following the notation of the Lemma, it is conceivable that some τ -theory T has a model
companion T ∗ and there is some some univesal τ -sentence θ such that for any model M
of T∀ + θ any superstructure of M which models T
∗ kills the truth of θ. In this case no
Π2-sentence in the Kaiser hull of T is consistent with the universal fragment of T∀ + θ.
3.5. Is model companionship a tameness notion? Model completeness and model
companionship are “tameness” notion for first order theories which must be handled with
care.
Proposition 3.21. Given a signature τ consider the signature τ∗ which adds an n-ary
predicate symbol Rφ for any τ -formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) with displayed free variables.
Let Tτ be the following τ
∗-theory:
• ∀~x (φ(~x)↔ Rφ(~x)) for all quantifier free τ -formulae φ(~x),
• ∀~x [Rφ∧ψ(~x)↔ (Rψ(~x) ∧Rφ(~x))] for all τ -formulae φ(~x), ψ(~x),
• ∀~x [R¬φ(~x)↔ ¬Rφ(~x)] for all τ -formulae φ(~x),
• ∀~x [∃yRφ(y, ~x)↔ R∃yφ(~x)] for all τ -formulae φ(y, ~x).
Then any τ -structure N admits a unique extension to a τ∗-structure N ∗ which models
Tτ . Moreover every τ
∗-formula is Tτ -equivalent to an atomic τ
∗-formula. In particular
for any τ -model N , the algebras of its τ -definable subsets and of the τ∗-definable subsets
of N ∗ are the same.
Therefore for any consistent τ -theory T , T ∪ Tτ is consistent and admits quantifier
elemination, hence is model complete.
Proof. By an easy induction one can prove that any τ -formula φ(~x) is Tτ -equivalent to the
atomic τ∗-formula Rφ(~x).
Another simple inductive argument brings that any τ∗-formula φ(~x) is Tτ -equivalent to
the τ -formula obtained by replacing all symbols Rψ(~x) occurring in φ by the τ -formula
ψ(~x). Combining these observations together we get that any τ∗-formula is equivalent to
an atomic τ∗-formula.
Tτ forces the M
∗-interpretation of any relation symbol Rφ(~x) in τ
∗ \ τ to be the M-
interpretation of the τ -formula φ(~x) to which it is Tτ -equivalent. 
Observe that the expansion of the language from τ to τ∗ behaves well with respect
to several model theoretic notions of tameness distinct from model completeness: for
example T is a stable τ -theory if and only if so is the τ∗-theory T ∪Tτ , the same holds for
NIP-theories, or for o-minimal theories, or for κ-categorical theories.
The passage from τ -structures to τ∗-structures which model Tτ can have effects on the
embeddability relation; for example assume M ⊑ N is a non-elementary embedding of
τ -structures; then M∗ 6⊑ N ∗: if the non-atomic τ -formula φ(~a) in parameter ~a ∈ M<ω
holds in M and does not hold in N , the atomic τ∗-formula Rφ(~a) holds in M
∗ and does
not hold in N ∗.
However if T is a model complete τ -theory, then forM⊑ N τ -models of T , we get that
M≺ N ; this entails that M∗ ⊑ N ∗, which (by the quantifier elimination of T ∪ Tτ ) gives
that M∗ ≺ N ∗. In particular for a model complete τ -theory T and M,N τ -models of T ,
M⊑ N if and only if M∗ ⊑ N ∗.
Let us now investigate the case of model companionship. If T is the model companion
of S with S 6= T in the signature τ , T ∪ Tτ and S ∪ Tτ are both model complete theories
in the signature τ∗. But T ∪ Tτ cannot be the model companion of S ∪ Tτ , by uniqueness
of the model companion, since each of these theories is the model companion of itself and
they are distinct. Moreover if T and S are also complete, no τ∗-model of S∪Tτ can embed
into a τ∗-model of T ∪ Tτ : since T is the model companion of S and S 6= T , T∀ = S∀
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and there is some Π2-sentence ψ ∀x∃yφ(x, y) with φ-quantifer free in T \ S. Therefore
∀xR∃yφ(x) ∈ (T ∪ Tτ )∀ \ (S ∪ Tτ )∀; we conclude by Lemma 3.2, since T ∪ Tτ and S ∪ Tτ
are complete, hence the above sentence separates (T ∪ Tτ )∀ from (S ∪ Tτ )∀.
3.6. Summing up. The results of this section gives that for any τ -theory T :
• The universal fragment of T describes the family of substructures of models of
T , and the T -ec models realize all Π2-sentences which are “absolutely” consistent
with T∀ (i.e. consistent with the universal fragment of any extension of T ).
• Model companionship and model completeness describe (almost all) the cases in
which the family of Π2-sentences which are “absolutely” consistent with T (as
defined in the previous item) describes the elementary class given by the T -ec
structures.
• One can always extend τ to a signature τ∗ so that T has a conservative extension
to a τ∗-theory T ∗ which is model complete, but this process may be completely
uninformative since it may completely destroy the substructure relation existing
between τ -models of T (unless T is already model complete).
• On the other hand for certain theories T (as the axiomatizations of set theory
considered in the present paper), one can unfold their “tameness” by carefully ex-
tending τ to a signature τ∗ in which only certain τ -formulae are made equivalent
to atomic τ∗-formulae. In the new signature T can be extended to a conservative
extension T ∗ which has a model companion T¯ , while this process has mild con-
sequences on the τ∗-substructure relation for models of T ∗∀ (i.e. for the pairs of
interest of τ -modelsM0 ⊑M1 of a suitable fragment of T , their unique extensions
to τ∗-models M∗i are still models of T
∗
∀ and maintain that M
∗
0 ⊑M
∗
1 also for τ
∗).
This gives useful structural information on the web of relations existing between
τ∗-models of T ∗∀ (as outlined by Theorems 1, 4, 3).
• Our conclusion is that model completeness and model companionship are tameness
properties of elementary classes E defined by a theory T rather than of the theory
T itself: these model-theoretic notions outline certain regularity patterns for the
substructure relation on models of E , patterns which may be unfolded only when
passing to a signature distinct from the one in which E is first axiomatized (much
the same way as it occurs for Birkhoff’s characterization of algebraic varieties in
terms of universal theories).
• The results of the present paper shows that if we consider set theory together with
large cardinal axioms as formalized in the signature σω, σω,NSω1 , σω1 , we obtain
(until now unexpected) tameness properties for this first order theory, properties
which couple perfectly with well known (or at least published) generic absoluteness
results. We do not have an abstract model theoretic justification for selecting
these signatures out of the continuum many signatures which produce definable
extensions of ZFC. However the common practice of set theory (independently of
our results) already motivate our choice, and our results validate it.
4. Auxiliary results
We collect here auxiliary results needed to prove Theorems 1 and 3. We prove all these
results working in “standard” models of ZFC, i.e. we assume the models are well-founded.
This is a practice we already adopted in Section 2. We leave to the reader to remove this
unnecessary assumption.
4.1. Generalizations of Levy absoluteness. We start with a natural generalization of
Levy’s absoluteness we used in the proof of Thm. 3.
Lemma 4.1. Let κ be an infinite cardinal and A be any family of subsets of
⋃
n∈ω P (κ)
n.
Let τA = τST ∪A.
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Then:
(HVκ+, τ
V
A ) ≺Σ1 (V, τ
V
A ).
Proof. Assume for some τA-formula φ(~x, y) without quantifiers
26 and ~a ∈ Hκ+
(V, τVA ) |= ∃yφ(~a, y).
Let α > κ be large enough so that for some b ∈ Vα
(V, τVA ) |= φ(~a, b).
Then
(Vα, τ
V
A ) |= φ(~a, b).
Let A1, . . . , Ak be the subsets of P (κ)
ik which are the predicates mentioned in φ. By
the downward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, we can find X ⊆ Vα which is the domain of a
τA1,...,Ak -elementary substructure of
(Vα, τST, A1, . . . , Ak)
such that X is a set of size κ containing κ and such that A1, . . . , Ak, κ, b,~a ∈ X. Since
|X| = κ ⊆ X, a standard argument shows that Hκ+ ∩X is a transitive set, and that κ
+
is the least ordinal in X which is not contained in X. Let M be the transitive collapse of
X via the Mostowski collapsing map πX .
We have that the first ordinal moved by πX is κ
+ and πX is the identity on Hκ+ ∩X.
Therefore πX(a) = a for all a ∈ Hκ+ ∩X. Moreover for A ⊆ P (κ)
n in X
(3) πX(A) = A ∩M.
We prove equation (3):
Proof. Since X ∩ Vκ+1 ⊆ X ∩Hκ+, πX is the identity on X ∩Hκ+ , and A ⊆ Vκ+1, we get
that
πX(A) = πX [A ∩X] = πX [A ∩X ∩ Vκ+1] = A ∩M ∩ Vκ+1 = A ∩M.

It suffices now to show that
(4) (M, τVST, πX(A1), . . . , πX(Ak)) ⊑ (Hκ+ , τ
V
ST, A1, . . . , Ak).
Assume 4 holds; since πX is an isomorphism and πX(Aj) = πX [Aj ∩X], we get that
(M, τVST, πX(A1), . . . , πX(Ak)) |= φ(πX(b),~a)
since
(X, τVST, A1 ∩X, . . . , Ak ∩X) |= φ(b,~a).
By (4) we get that
(Hκ+ , τ
V
ST, πX(A1), . . . , πX(Ak)) |= φ(πX(b),~a)
and we are done.
We prove (4): since M is transitive, any atomic τST-formula (i.e. any ∆0-property)
holds true in M if and if it holds in Hκ+. It remains to argue that the same occurs for the
τA-formulae of type Aj(x), i.e. that Aj ∩M = πX(Aj) for all j = 1, . . . , n; which is the
case by (3). 
Remark 4.2. Key to the proof is the fact that subsets of κ have bounded rank below κ+.
If A ⊆ Hκ+ has elements of unbounded rank, the equality πX(A) = A ∩M may fail: for
example if A = Hκ+, πX(A) = Hκ+ ∩X while A ∩M = M . This shows that 4 fails for
this choice of A.
26A quantifier free τA1,...,Ak -formula is a boolean combination of atomic τST-formulae with formulae of
type Aj(~x). For example ∃x ∈ yA(y) is not a quantifier free τST-formula, and is actually equivalent to the
Σ1-formula ∃x(x ∈ y) ∧A(y).
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4.2. Universally Baire sets and generic absoluteness for second order number
theory. We collect here the properties of universally Baire sets and the generic absolute-
ness results for second order number theory we need to prove Thm. 1.
Notation 4.3. A ⊆
⋃
n∈ω P (κ)
n is projectively closed if it is closed under projections,
finite unions, complementation, and permutations (if σ : n → n is a permutation and
A ⊆ P (κ)n, σˆ[A] =
{
(aσ(0), . . . , aσ(n−1) : (a0, . . . , an−1) ∈ A
}
).
Otherwise said, A is the class of lightface definable subsets of some signature on P (κ).
4.3. Universally Baire sets. Assuming large cardinals there is a very large sample of
projectively closed families of subsets of P (ω) which are are “simple”, hence it is natural
to consider elements of these families as atomic predicates.
The exact definition of what is meant by a “simple” subset of 2ω is captured by the
notion of universally Baire set.
Given a topological space (X, τ), A ⊆ X is nowhere dense if its closure has a dense
complement, meager if it is the countable union of nowhere dense sets, with the Baire
property if it has meager symmetric difference with an open set. Recall that (X, τ) is
Polish if τ is a completely metrizable, separable topology on X.
Definition 4.4. (Feng, Magidor, Woodin) Given a Polish space (X, τ), A ⊆ X is univer-
sally Baire if for every compact Hausdorff space (Y, σ) and every continuous f : Y → X
we have that f−1[A] has the Baire property in Y .
UB denotes the family of universally Baire subsets of X for some Polish space X.
We adopt the convention that UB denotes the class of universally Baire sets and of all
elements of
⋃
n∈ω+1(2
ω)n (since the singleton of such elements are universally Baire sets).
The theorem below outlines three simple examples of projectively closed families of
universally Baire sets containing 2ω.
Theorem 4.5. Let T0 be the τST-theory ZFC
∗+there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals
and a measurable above and T1 be the τST-theory ZFC
∗+there are class many Woodin
cardinals.
(1) [13, Thm. 3.1.12, Thm. 3.1.19] Assume V models T0. Then every projective
subset of 2ω is universally Baire.
(2) [13, Thm. 3.3.3, Thm. 3.3.5, Thm. 3.3.6, Thm. 3.3.8, Thm. 3.3.13, Thm.
3.3.14] Assume V |= T1. Then UB is projectively closed.
To proceed further we now list the standard facts about universally Baire sets we will
need:
(1) [9, Thm. 32.22] A ⊆ 2ω is universally Baire if and only if for each forcing notion
P there are trees TA, SA on ω × δ for some δ > |P | such that A = p[[TA]] (where
p : (2 × κ)ω → 2ω denotes the projection on the first component and [T ] denotes
the body of the tree T ), and
P  TA and SA project to complements,
by this meaning that for all G V -generic for P
V [G] |= (p[[TA]] ∩ p[[SA]] = ∅) ∧ (p[[TA]] ∪ p[[SA]] = (2
ω)V [G])
(2) Any two Polish spaces X,Y of the same cardinality are Borel isomorphic [10, Thm.
15.6].
(3) Any Polish space is Borel isomorphic to a Borel subset of [0; 1]ω [10, Thm. 4.14],
hence also to a Borel subset of 2ω (by the previous item).
(4) Given φ : N→ N,
∏
n∈ω 2
φ(n) is Polish (it is actually homemomorphic to the union
of 2ω with a countable Hausdorff space) [10, Thm. 6.4, Thm. 7.4].
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Hence it is not restrictive to focus just on universally Baire subsets of 2ω and of its
countable products, which is what we will do in the sequel.
Notation 4.6. Given G a V -generic filter for some forcing P ∈ V , A ∈ UBV [G] and H
V [G]-generic filter for some forcing Q ∈ V [G],
AV [G][H] =
{
r ∈ (2ω)V [G][H] : V [G][H] |= r ∈ p[[TA]]
}
,
where (TA, SA) ∈ V [G] is any pair of trees as given in item 1 above such that p[[TA]] = A
holds in V [G], and (TA, SA) project to complements in V [G][H].
4.4. Generic absoluteness for second order number theory. We decide to include a
full proof of Woodin’s generic absoluteness results for second order number theory we used,
it follows readily from [13, Thm. 3.1.2] and the assumptions that there exists class many
Woodin limits of Woodin, we reduce these large cardinal assumptions to the existence
of class many Woodin cardinals, while providing an alternative approach to the proof of
some of Woodin’s result. The theorem below is an improvement of [17, Thm. 3.1].
Theorem 4.7. Assume in V there are class many Woodin cardinals. Let A ∈ V be a
family of universally Baire sets of V and τA = τST ∪ A. Let G be V -generic for some
forcing notion P ∈ V .
Then
(Hω1 , τ
V
A ) ≺ (H
V [G]
ω1
, τ
V [G]
ST
, AV [G] : A ∈ A).
Proof. We proceed by induction on n to prove the following stronger assertion
Claim 6. Whenever G is V -generic for some forcing notion P in V and H is V [G]-generic
for some forcing notion Q in V [G]
(HV [G]ω1 , τ
V [G]
ST
, AV [G] : A ∈ A) ≺n (H
V [G][H]
ω1
, τ
V [G][H]
ST
, AV [G][H] : A ∈ A).
Proof. It is not hard to check that for all A ∈ A, AV [G] = AV [G][H] ∩ V [G] (choose in V
a pair of trees (T, S) such that A = p[[T ]] and the pair (T, S) projects to complements
in V [G][H], and therefore also in V [G]). Therefore (H
V [G]
ω1 , τ
V [G]
ST
, AV [G] : A ∈ A) is a
τA-substructure of (H
V [G][H]
ω1 , τ
V [G][H]
ST
, AV [G][H] : A ∈ A).
This proves the base case of the induction.
We prove the successor step.
Assume that for any G V -generic for some forcing P ∈ V and H V [G]-generic for some
forcing Q ∈ V [G]
(HV [G]ω1 , τ
V [G]
ST
, AV [G] : A ∈ A) ≺n (H
V [G][H]
ω1
, τ
V [G][H]
ST
, AV [G][H] : A ∈ A).
Fix G¯ and H¯ as in the assumptions of the Claim as witnessed by forcings P¯ ∈ V and
Q¯ ∈ V [G¯].
We want to show that
(HV [G¯]ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A) ≺n+1 (H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1
, τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A).
Let γ be a Woodin cardinal of V such that P¯ ∗ ˙¯Q ∈ Vγ (where
˙¯Q ∈ V P is chosen so that
˙¯QG = Q¯).
Then γ is Woodin also in V [G¯]. Let K be V [G¯]-generic for27 (T ω1γ )
V [G¯] with H¯ ∈ V [K],
so that V [G¯][K] = V [G¯][H¯][K¯ ] for some K¯ ∈ V [G¯][K].
27T ω1γ denotes here the countable tower of height γ denoted as Q<γ in [13, Section 2.7].
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Hence we have the following diagram:
(H
V [G¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A) (H
V [G¯][K]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯][K]
ST
, AV [G¯][K] : A ∈ A)
(H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A)
Σω
ΣnΣn
obtained by inductive hypothesis applied both on V [G¯], V [G¯][H¯] and on V [G¯][H¯ ], V [G¯][H¯ ][K¯],
and using the fact that (H
V [G¯][K]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯][K]
UB
V [G¯]
) is a fully elementary superstructure of (H
V [G¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
UB
V [G¯]
)
[13, Thm. 2.7.7, Thm. 2.7.8].
Let φ ≡ ∃xψ(x) be any Σn+1 formula for τA with parameters in H
V [G¯]
ω1 . First suppose
that φ holds in (H
V [G¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A), and fix a¯ ∈ V [G¯] such that ψ(a¯) holds in
(H
V [G¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A). Since
(HV [G¯]ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A) ≺n (H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1
, τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A),
we conclude that ψ(a¯) holds in (H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A), hence so does φ.
Now suppose that φ holds in (H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A) as witnessed by
a¯ ∈ H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1 .
Since
(HV [G¯][H¯]ω1 , τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A) ≺n (H
V [G¯][K]
ω1
, τ
V [G¯][K]
ST
, AV [G¯][K] : A ∈ A),
it follows that ψ(a¯) holds in (H
V [G¯][K]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯][K]
ST
, AV [G¯][K] : A ∈ A), hence so does φ. Since
(HV [G¯]ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A) ≺ (HV [G¯][K]ω1 , τ
V [G¯][K]
ST
, AV [G¯][K] : A ∈ A),
the formula φ holds also in (H
V [G¯]
ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A).
Since φ is arbitrary, this shows that
(HV [G¯][H¯]ω1 , τ
V [G¯]
ST
, AV [G¯] : A ∈ A) ≺n+1 (H
V [G¯][H¯]
ω1
, τ
V [G¯][H¯]
ST
, AV [G¯][H¯] : A ∈ A),
concluding the proof of the inductive step for G¯ and H¯.
Since we have class many Woodin, this argument is modular in G¯, H¯ as in the assump-
tions of the inductive step, because we can always find some Woodin cardinal γ of V
which remains Woodin in V [G¯] and is of size larger than the poset in V [G¯] for which H¯ is
V [G¯]-generic. The proof of the inductive step is completed. 

5. Further results
We introduce without a few comments the results whose proof is defered to a second
paper, together with the relevant terminology and definitions. The following supplements
Notation 2.
Notation 3.
• τNSω1 is the signature τST ∪ {ω1} ∪ {NSω1} with ω1 a constant symbol, NSω1 a
unary predicate symbol.
• TNSω1 is the τNSω1 -theory given by TST together with the axioms
ω1 is the first uncountable cardinal,
∀x [(x ⊆ ω1 is non-stationary)↔ NSω1(x)].
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• ZFC−
NSω1
is the τNSω1 -theory
ZFC
−
ST
+ TNSω1 .
• Accordingly we define ZFCNSω1 .
Theorem 5. Let V = (V,∈) be a model of
ZFC+MAX(UB) + there is a supercompact cardinal and class many Woodin cardinals,
and UB denote the family of universally Baire sets in V .
TFAE
(1) (V,∈) models (∗)-UB;
(2) NSω1 is precipitous
28 and the τNSω1 ∪UB-theory of V has as model companion the
τNSω1 ∪ UB-theory of Hω2 .
Here is the definition of MAX(UB) and (∗)-UB:
Definition 1. MAX(UB): There are class many Woodin cardinals in V , and for all G
V -generic for some forcing notion P ∈ V :
(1) Any subset of (2ω)V [G] definable in (H
V [G]
ω1 ∪UB
V [G],∈) is universally Baire in V [G].
(2) Let H be V [G]-generic for some forcing notion Q ∈ V [G]. Then29:
(HV [G]ω1 ∪ UB
V [G],∈) ≺ (HV [G][H]ω1 ∪ UB
V [G][H],∈).
MAX(UB) is a form of sharp for the universally Baire sets (a slight weakening of the
conclusion of [13, Thm. 4.17]). It holds in any forcing extension of V where a supercompact
of V becomes countable. We will comment in details on MAX(UB) in the sequel of this
paper.
See [12] for a definition of Pmax and [13, Section 1.6, pag. 39] for a definition of saturated
ideal on ω1.
Definition 2. Let A be a family of dense subsets of Pmax.
• (∗)-A holds if NSω1 is saturated and there exists a filter G on Pmax meeting all
the dense sets in A.
• (∗)-UB holds if NSω1 is saturated and there exists an L(UB)-generic filter G on
Pmax.
Woodin’s definition of (∗) [12, Def. 7.5] is equivalent to (∗)-A+there are class many
Woodin cardinals for A the family of dense subsets of Pmax existing in L(R).
Theorem 6. Assume V models that there are class many Woodin cardinals and UB is the
family of universally Baire sets in V . Then the Π1-theory of V for the language τNSω1 ∪UB
is invariant under set sized forcings.
Notation 4.
• Given a family A of predicate symbols:
– σA = τST ∪A,
28See [13, Section 1.6, pag. 41] for a definition of precipitousness and a discussion of its properties. A
key observation is that NSω1 being precipitous is independent of CH (see for example [13, Thm. 1.6.24]),
while (∗)-UB entails 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 (for example by the results of [12, Section 6]).
Another key point is that we stick to the formulation of Pmax as in [12] so to be able in its proof to quote
verbatim from [12] all the relevant results on Pmax-preconditions we will use. It is however possible to
develop Pmax focusing on Woodin’s countable tower rather than on the precipitousness of NSω1 to develop
the notion of Pmax-precondition. Following this approach in all its scopes, one should be able to reformulate
Thm. 5(2) omitting the request that NSω1 is precipitous. We do not explore this venue any further neither
here nor in the sequel of this paper.
29Elementarity is witnessed via the map defined by A 7→ AV [G][H] for A ∈ UBV [G] and the identity on
H
V [G]
ω1 (See Notation 4.6 for the definition of A
V [G][H]).
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– σA,NSω1 = τNSω1 ∪ A,
– σω is σA for A = σST,
– σω,NSω1 is σA,NSω1 for A = σST.
• Let UB denote the family of universally Baire sets, and L(UB) denote the smallest
transitive model of ZF which contains UB.
Tl-UB is the σω,NSω1 -theory given by the axioms
∀x1 . . . xn [Sψ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ (
n∧
i=1
xi ⊆ ω
<ω ∧ ψL(UB)(x1, . . . , xn))]
as ψ ranges over the ∈-formulae.
• ZFC∗−l-UB is the σω-theory
ZFC
−
ST
∪ Tl-UB;
• ZFC∗−l-UB,NSω1
is the σω,NSω1 -theory
ZFC
−
NSω1
∪ Tl-UB;
• Accordingly we define ZFCNSω1 , ZFC
∗
l-UB, ZFC
∗
l-UB,NSω1
.
Theorem 7. Let T be any σω,NSω1 -theory extending
ZFC
∗
l-UB,NSω1
+MAX(UB)+ there is a supercompact cardinal and class many Woodin cardinals.
Then T has a model companion T ∗.
Moreover TFAE for any for any Π2-sentence ψ for σω,NSω1 :
(A) T ∗ ⊢ ψ.
(B) For any complete theory
S ⊇ T,
S∀ ∪ {ψ} is consistent.
(C) T proves
∃P (P is a partial order ∧ P ψ
H˙ω2 ).
(D) T∀ + ZFC
∗
l-UB,NSω1
+MAX(UB) + (∗)-UB ⊢ ψHω2 .
(E) T proves that
(Pmax  ψ
H˙ω2 )L(UB).
We immediately obtain Thm. 2 as a corollary of Thm. 7 and Thm. 6:
Proof. Note that every lightface projective set is in L(UB) (since the quantifer defin-
ing the set range over P (ω) ⊆ L(UB); hence we can assume that ZFC∗ω,NSω1 is a frag-
ment of ZFC∗l-UB,NSω1
: the interpretation of Sθ according to ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
is the same of
S
θP(ω
<ω) according to ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
which has the same interpretation of S
θP(ω
<ω) according
to ZFC∗l-UB,NSω1
. Therefore a Π2-sentence for σω in the theory ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
can be regarded
as a Π2-sentence also for the theory ZFC
∗
l-UB,NSω1
.
(3) implies (2): If P forces MM++, by Aspero` and Schindler’s result, P  (∗)-UB; hence
P  ψHω2 by (3).
(2) implies (1): Given some complete S ⊇ T , and a model M of S, find N forcing
extension of M which models ψHω2 . By Thm. 6 and Lemma 4.1, HNω2 |= S∀ and
we are done.
(1) implies (3): assume M models
T∀ + ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
+ θSC + (∗)-UB;
find N forcing extension of M which models
T∀ + ZFC
∗
ω,NSω1
+MAX(UB).
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By Thm. 6 and (1), ψ is consistent with the Π1-theory of N . By the equivalence
of (A) with (D) of Thm. 3 applied to the Π1-complete theory of N , we get
that N models ψHω2 is forcible by Pmax over L(UB). Since all the universally
Baire predicates predicates appearing in ψ are projective and lightface definable,
N models ψHω2 is forcible by Pmax over L(R). Since L(R)
M and L(R)N are
elementarily equivalent (without any need to appeal to MAX(UB), but just to
θSC and [13, Thm. 3.1.2]), we get that M models ψ
Hω2 is forcible by Pmax over
L(R). Since M |= (∗)-UB, we conclude that ψHω2 holds in M.

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